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PREFACE 
Interest in human settlement systems and policies has been a critical 
part o i  urban-related work at  IIASA since its inception. Recently this 
interest has given rise to  a concentrated research effort focusing on migra- 
tion dynamics and settlement patterns. Four subtasks form the core of this 
research effort: 
- The study of spatial population dynamics; 
- The definition and elaboration of a new research area called 
demometrics and its application t o  migration analysis and 
spatial population forecasting; 
- The analysis and design of migration and settlement policy; 
- A comparative study of national migration and settlement 
patterns and policies. 
This paper, the fourth of a series on policy design and analysis, is an 
exposition of several fundamental themes in two related but largely indepen- 
dent bodies of literature: the  mostly mathematical literature in systems 
engineering that deals with the control of complex systems describable by 
sets of differential or difference equations, and the more substantive litera- 
ture in the formal theory of economic growth and policy. The logical 
structures of the two paradigms are similar, and, as the paper illustrates, 
their formalisms can be fruitfully transferred to  the field of population 
policy. T o  introduce the subject matter to a wider audience, the authors 
have sought t o  make the paper relatively self-contained by including some 
introductory descriptive material on population dynamics and economic 
growth theory. 
We are grateful to  Brian Arthur for several invaluable suggestions and 
to  Neil Ericsson and Roman Kulikowski for readin: and commenting on 
an earlier draft. 
Related papers in the policy analysis series, and other publications 
of the migration and settlement study, are listed at  the back of this report. 
Andrei Rogers. Chairman 





This report is an expository state-of-the-art review of several funda- 
mental themes in two related but largely unconnected bodies of literature. 
The focus is on recent attempts to design comprehensive dynamic demo- 
economic policy models that are formally stated as optimal control prob- 
lems. Two groups of models are distinguished: planning-oriented models, 
which originated in systems engineering and economics and which are 
designed to aid practical problem solving; and theoretically-oriented models, 
which have been developed in economic growth theory and which are 
intended to provide theoretical insights into the dynamics of economic 
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Normative Modeling in Demo-Economics 
INTRODUCTION 
Social concern with population processes arises when the 
demographic acts of individuals affect the welfare of others 
and produce a sharp divergence between the sum of individual 
(private) preferences and social well-being. In such instances, 
population processes properly become the subject of public debate 
and the object of public policy. 
Population policy has a special feature that makes it a 
difficult research topic. Although a central element of any 
demographic policy is the size and the distribution of popula- 
tion, neither the goals nor the means of such a policy are purely 
demographic. A population trend is viewed as being good or bad 
in the light of its presumed social and economic consequences. 
That is, a population policy is an instrument to achieve non- 
demographic goals. Davis (1971, p. 7) described a population 
policy as one that tries to eliminate the demographic causes of 
the problems to be solved. 
The importance of social and economic considerations in 
formulating population policies was stressed by the World Popula- 
tion Conference in Bucharest in 1974. The Conference strongly 
endorsed the view that demographic matters considered in isola- 
tion from economic and social factors have little significance 
(Tabah, 1975, p. 380). This is particularly true of migration. 
It is impossible to determine the goals and means of population 
distribution policies without considering general economic and 
social policies. Typically, human settlement programs are part 
of a regional economic policy, or of a land use policy, or of a 
physical planning program (for an illustrative review of popula- 
tion distribution policies in several developed countries, see 
Willekens, 1976a, pp. 31-55). 
The interdependence of economics and demography is also 
reflected in policy-modeling efforts. Models of demo-economic 
growth and policy are receiving considerable attention in eco- 
nomics and in demography. (For a bibliography see Bilsborrow, 
1976.) 
In most of modern economic growth theory, population is 
entered as an exogenous variable affecting economic growth 
through the labor supply, but itself being unaffected by changes 
in economic conditions. A few economists have endogenized popu- 
lation in their models by relating it to per capita income or a 
similar economic index. Although the treatment of population 
as an endogenous variable in economic growth models is of recent 
date, the notion itself has a long history. Classical economists 
such as Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, J.S. Mill, and Ricardo all 
viewed population as being intimately dependent on the state of 
the economy. 
Demographers, too, have only recently attempted to extend 
purely demographic models of population growth to include eco- 
nomic factors. And, again, the notion is not new. More than 
fifty years ago, Lotka (1925) already was stressing the impor- 
tance of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of population. 
He considered population not in isolation but as part of a larger 
ecosystem. The demographic growth model he proposed, which has 
become the basis of modern mathematical demography, was derived 
as part of a larger ecological study. 
This paper reviews several recent policy models in which 
demographic and economic variables are endogenous. The models 
investigated are those with explicit policy objectives. To place 
the models in perspective, however, we first propose a classifi- 
cation of existing demo-economic models. Then, we introduce the 
basic mathematical apparatus common to all models treated in the 
remainder of the paper. 
Demo-Economic Models: A Classification 
Because the number of demo-economic models is large and 
growing rapidly, a classification may be useful. Realizing that 
any classification is to some degree arbitrary, and that classi- 
fying items is done more for pragmatic than for scientific rea- 
sons, we adopt the following three-way classification scheme 
(for another classification, see McNicoll, 1975): 
- Models of demo-economic growth, 
- Demo-economic simulation models, 
- Models of demo-economic policy. 
blodels of Demo-Economic Growth 
The main purpose of these models is to describe or to 
e x p l a i n  demographic and/or economic growth by considering both 
demographic and economic variables in an interdependent way. 
Their fundarnental feature is the simultaneous endogenous treat- 
ment of demographic and economic growth. We shall consider 
three types of such models: demometric growth models, neoclas- 
sical growth models, and dualistic growth models. 
The first category contains empirically-oriented models 
that frequently are developed as part of an inductive investiga- 
tion of demo-economic growth. They are closely related to econo- 
metric growth models. Greenwood's (1975) simultaneous equations 
model of urban growth and migration is an example. 
The second and third categories embrace theoretically- 
oriented models developed as aids in the deductive analysis of 
demo-economic growth. Their purpose is not to predict real 
situations, but rather to gain theoretical insights into real 
processes. 
Neoclassical growth models have received most attention in 
economic growth theory (see e.g. Burmeister and Dobell, 1970). 
The term "neoclassical" is used to describe supply-oriented 
models, in contrast to Keynesian models, in which production and 
the use of resources are determined by aggregate demand rather 
than supply (McNicoll, 197 5, p. 649). 
Models of the dual economy are best known in the economic 
development literature. Although not generally thought of as 
demo-economic growth models, they are included in this classifi- 
cation because of their use of migration as an adjustment mech- 
anism assuring labor market equilibrium. Models of the dual 
economy have been developed by Lewis (1 95 4) , Ranis and Fei ( 1 96 1 ) , 
and Jorgenson (1 961 ) , and extended by Kelley, Williamson and 
Cheetham (1972), and Todaro (1969), among others. 
Demo-Economic Simulation Models 
The distinction between simulation models and descriptive 
and explanatory growth models is fuzzy. Any demo-economic simu- 
lation model contains a growth model as its central and vital 
element. The quality of a simulation model varies directly with 
the quality of its growth model. The fundamental difference 
arises from the aims of the two kinds of models. While the 
second group of models are intended to describe or to explain, 
simulation models are meant to demonstrate and compare impacts 
of alternative policies or of alternative trajectories of exog- 
enous variables, and therefore are impact evaluation tools. In 
this sense, policy simulation models may be descriptive or ex- 
planatory models that are adapted to investigate the sensitivity 
of the system to be studied to changes in predefined instrument 
and exogenous variables. 
Demo-economic simulation models usually are designed to 
explore the economic implications of alternative population 
trajectories and trajectories of demographic parameters, and 
very rarely do they try to describe the evolution of a complete 
demo-economic system under changing conditions. One of the 
earliest examples of models of this type is the Coale-Hoover 
(1958) model for India. It focused on the impact of fertility 
reduction and the consequent changes in the size and age distri- 
bution of the population on economic development, in casu employ- 
ment (labor), investments (capital) and per capita income. This 
model has produced a number of progeny (Demeny, 1965; Enke et al., 
1968). 
A few attempts have been made to simulate in a truly inte- 
grated manner the interdependencies in a demo-economic system. 
The first models of this sort are macro-economic models with 
population as an endogenous variable. Their principal purpose 
is not to represent the full complexity of the real situation, 
but rather to identify important insights about the demo-economic 
process. This class of macro-simulation models of demo-economic 
systems is illustrated by the Yap (1976) model for Brazil, de- 
signed to simulate the interaction between rural-urban migration 
and economic development, and by Kelley and Williamson's (1974) 
model of Meiji, Japan. 
Finally, large-scale data-based models have been developed 
to simulate the evolution of demo-economic systems. The "Bachue" 
model of the International Labour Office, for example, considers 
a multisectoral economy and a disaggregated demographic system 
in a study of alternative employment-generation strategies. 
Economic development depends on demographic change, and fertility, 
mortality, and migration patterns are determined by the economy. 
For a critical review of some of the models, see Arthur and 
McNicoll (1 976). 
Models of Demo-Economic Policy 
Demo-economic policy models strive to prescribe comprehensive 
demographic and economic policies. Policy objectives and policy 
instruments are stated explicitly. Objectives may be expressed 
as a set of targets to be reached, as an overall welfare index 
to be maximized, or as a combination of both. The models are 
dynamic in the sense that instruments and objectives belong to 
different time periods. Formally, the dynamic policy problem is 
that of choosing time paths for certain variables, called instru- 
ment or control variables, from a given set of feasible time 
paths, so as to maximize a given objective or to achieve given 
targets (compare this formal statement with that of Intriligator, 
1971, p. 292). When presented in this form, the dynamic policy 
problem becomes an optimal control or dynamic optimization prob- 
lem. Therefore, a convenient analytical framework for the study 
of quantitative dynamic demo-economic policy is the theory of 
optimal control. In other words, the population policy problem 
may formally be stated as a problem of optimal control (see 
Arthur and McNicoll, 1972, p. 2; Willekens, 1976b, p. 86). For 
the analogy in economic policy, see for example Chow (1973, 1975) 
and Pindyck (1 973a) . 
Within the formal framework of optimal control, two groups 
of demo-economic policy models may be distinguished: planning- 
oriented policy models and theoretically-oriented policy models. 
The latter are set up to gain theoretical insights into the 
characteristics of an optimal demo-economic system. Their aggre- 
gation level is usually high, and the underlying growth model is 
generally of the neoclassical type. The first category comprises 
models designed to aid policy-makers to solve practical problems. 
They are usually more disaggregated and imbed an empirically- 
oriented or demometric growth model. While most models of the 
first kind have been developed by authors more directly inter- 
ested in the planning of the growth and the distribution of the 
population, most of the second kind originated in economic 
growth theory. 
In the remaining sections of the paper, we investigate some 
features of demo-economic policy models of the optimal control 
type. The first part is devoted to planning-oriented models. 
The second part reviews the theoretically-oriented models. 
First, however, we need to introduce some of the optimal control 
vocabulary. 
The Formal Dynamic Policy Problem 
The basic ingredients of an optimal control problem are 
(i) a state equation describing the dynamics or "laws of motion" 
of the system, (ii) a set of constraints on the state and con- 
trol variables, (iii) a set of boundary conditions, and (iv) a 
performance index or objective function (see for example Bryson 
and Ho, 1969). 
State Equation 
Let the vector {~(t)} denote the state of the system at 
time t. The state vector may refer to the population distribu- 
tion by age or region, or to economic stock variables such as 
capital. The control vector {u(t)} contains the instruments or 
policy variables which may be Sontrolled by the policy-maker. 
The dynamics of the system are described by a set of differential 
or difference equations, the so-called state equations: 
In this paper, the state equations usually describe population 
growth and capital accumulation. In other words, the state 
variables are population and capital. 
Constraints 
The dynamics of the state and control variables may be con- 
strained for economic, political, or other reasons. Let the 
set o f  a d m i s s i b l e  s t a t e  and c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s  b e  d e f i n e d  by t h e  
v e c t o r - v a l u e d  f u n c t i o n  { g  - ( . ) ) : 
Boundary C o n d i t i o n s  
The i n i t i a l  s t a t e  is  g i v e n :  
Sometimes t h e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s  must  s a t i s f y  
c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  a t  t h e  p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n  T. These  a r e  de-  
s c r i b e d  by t h e  v e c t o r - v a l u e d  f u n c t i o n  
Per fo rmance  Index  
The g e n e r a l  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  pe r fo rmance  i n d e x  t o  b e  
o p t i m i z e d  i s  
f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  model ,  and 
f o r  t h e  d i s c r e t e  model .  
The dynamic p o l i c y  o r  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  problem is  t h e n  formu- 
l a t e d  a s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  sequence  [ u * ( t ) )  f o r  
t = 0, ..., T-1, and t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t r a j e c t o r y  of t h e  s t a t e  
v e c t o r  { x * ( t ) )  f o r  t = 0, ..., T,  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  sys tems  dynamics  
( 1 )  o r  ( 2 ) ,  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( 3 ) ,  and t h e  boundary c o n d i t i o n s  ( 4 )  
and ( 5 )  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  and t h e  pe r fo rmance  i n d e x  ( 6 )  o r  ( 7 )  is  
o p t i m i z e d .  The sequence  { g * ( t ) )  i s  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  and 
{ x * ( t ) )  i s  t h e  o p t i m a l  t r a j e c t o r y .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  
c o n t r o l  problem i s  t o  s t e e r  a  dynamic  s y s t e m  s o  a s  t o  o p t i m i z e  
a  per formance  i n d e x ,  s u b j e c t  t o  c o n s t r a i n t s .  T h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n  
is  a  v e r y  g e n e r a l  one  and encompasses  most  dynamic p o p u l a t i o n  
p o l i c y  p rob lems .  
PLANNING-ORIENTED POLICY MODELS 
The models discussed in this section all have a common 
feature: they may be considered as logical extensions of demo- 
graphic growth models to the policy domain. To demonstrate 
this, we will gradually build up policy models of greater degrees 
of complexity, starting with growth models that have been studied 
in mathematical demography. 
Malthus can probably be credited with formulating the first 
model of population growth: "Population, when unchecked, in- 
creases at a geometrical ratio" (Malthus, 1798, p. 13). Denot- 
ing the population size by N and the rate of population growth 
by n, Malthus' model may be represented by a first-order differ- 
ential equation 
with the solution 
The discrete form of Malthus' model is the difference equa- 
t ion 
with the solution 
More recently, the aggregate model in (10) has been disag- 
gregated to treat population growth by age (Leslie, 1945; 
Keyfitz, 1968), by region (Rogers, 1968), and by age and region 
(Rogers, 1975). The disaggregated model takes the form of a 
set of linear, first-order, homogeneous difference equations 
with the simple expression: 
where the elements of the vector t~(t)l denote the number of 
- 
p e o p l e  a t  t i m e  t by a g e  g r o u p  and/or  by r e g i o n ,  and G i s  t h e  
a s s o c i a t e d  p o p u l a t i o n  growth m a t r i x .  * - 
The s o l u t i o n  o f  ( 1 2 )  f o r  an  unchanging G i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  
- 
I n  t e r m s  of t h e  s t a n d a r d  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  problem p r e s e n t e d  
i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  g rowth  model ( 1 2 )  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  
homogeneous p a r t  o f  t h e  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 ) .  The p o p u l a t i o n  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  v e c t o r  { ~ ( t ) }  i s  t h e  s t a t e  v e c t o r  and t h e  g rowth  
m a t r i x  is t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  m a t r i x .  The model d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
dynamics  o f  a n  age- and/or  r e g i o n - s p e c i f i c  p o p u l a t i o n  sys tem 
t h a t  i s  u n d i s t u r b e d  by exogenous f o r c e s  ( s u c h  a s  e x t e r n a l  migra -  
t i o n )  and f r e e  o f  any p o l i c y  i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  
The demographic  g rowth  model may be c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  a  com- 
p l e t e  p o l i c y  model i n  a  number o f  s t e p s .  It i s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  t o  b u i l d  up s u c h  a  p o l i c y  model and t o  p r o v i d e  a  
framework f o r  comparing e x i s t i n g  and p o t e n t i a l  p l a n n i n g - o r i e n t e d  
p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  models .  
The f i r s t  s t e p  i s  t o  t r a n s f o r m  t h e  g rowth  model (12)  i n t o  
a  comple te  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  by a d d i n g  a  sequence  o f  v e c t o r s  
d e s c r i b i n g  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n s  i n  t i m e  (and s p a c e ) .  The s i m p l e s t  
model (Rogers ,  1966, 1968, 1971)  i s  a  p u r e l y  demographic  o n e ;  
i . e . ,  b o t h  t h e  s t a t e  and t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  a r e  i n  t e r m s  o f  demo- 
g r a p h i c  v a r i a b l e s ,  s u c h  a s  f e r t i l i t y  and m i g r a t i o n  ( s e e  a l s o  
MacKinnon, 1 9 7 5 ) .  T h i s  model and i t s  v a r i a n t s  w i l l  b e  rev iewed  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  The second  p a r t  e x t e n d s  t h i s  
p o l i c y  model t o  i n c l u d e  economic c o n t r o l  and s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s ,  
and c o n s i d e r s  c o n s t r a i n t s  and o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  e x p l i c i t l y .  
A M a t r i x  Model o f  P o p u l a t i o n  C o n t r o l  
R e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  g rowth  o f  a  demographic  s y s t e m  may be r e p r e -  
s e n t e d  by t h e  m a t r i x  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 2 ) .  To i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  a  b i r t h  o r  m i g r a t i o n  c o n t r o l  p o l i c y  on an  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  popu- 
l a t i o n  sys tem,  one  may i n t r o d u c e  a  c o n s t a n t - i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( c o n t r o l )  
v e c t o r  t h a t  i s  added t o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  e a c h  t i m e  p e r i o d  
a s  f o l l o w s :  
* I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  K i s  used b o t h  f o r  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t e d  by a g e  
and f o r  c a p i t a l  (pp .  26-48) .  P o p u l a t i o n  by a g e ,  however ,  i s  
a lways  a  v e c t o r  C ~ ( t ) l .  These  n o t a t i o n s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
c o n v e n t i o n s  i n  demography and economics .  
The v e c t o r  {a} may have  b o t h  p o s i t i v e  and n e g a t i v e  compo- 
n e n t s .  A p o s i t i v e  mi i n d i c a t e s  t h e  number o f  p e o p l e  t h a t  must 
be added t o  a  r e g i o n ' s  p o p u l a t i o n  d u r i n g  e a c h  u n i t  i n t e r v a l  of 
t i m e ;  a  n e g a t i v e  fi d e n o t e s  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  h a s  t o  be  p e r i -  i 
o d i c a l l y  wi thdrawn from r e g i o n  i. I n  a n a l y s e s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
b i r t h  c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s ,  a  n e g a t i v e  E. may be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  
number o f  b i r t h s  t h a t  must be  p r e v e n t e d  f rom o c c u r r i n g  d u r i n g  
e a c h  u n i t  i n t e r v a l  o f  t i m e .  
Beginning w i t h  a n  i n i t i a l  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  some p o i n t  i n  t i m e ,  
s a y ,  t = 0, we may t r a c e  t h e  e f f e c t s  of a  p o l i c y  c o n t r o l  measure  
o v e r  t i m e  by r e p e a t e d l y  a p p l y i n g  ( 1 4 ) :  
and 
P r e m u l t i p l y i n g  b o t h  s i d e s  o f  ( 1 6 )  by G ,  and s u b t r a c t i n g  t h e  
r e s u l t  from ( 1 6 ) ,  g i v e s ,  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s  o f  G m a t r i c e s ,  
T h e r e f o r e ,  
Note t h a t  ( 1 8 )  i s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  e q u a t i o n  (14)  . 
Equa t ion  (1 8 )  may e a s i l y  be  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  a  p o l i c y  model 
under  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  g o a l s  o f  a  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  p o l i c y  must be e x p r e s s e d  i n  t e r m s  of p o p u l a t i o n  t a r g e t s  
t 
a t  a  p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n .  Second, t h e  m a t r i x  (; - G ) i s  non- 
s i n g u l a r ;  t h i s  i s  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
controZZability of  t h e  sys tem d e s c r i b e d  by ( 1 4 )  ( W i l l e k e n s ,  
1976b, Ch. 2 ) . *  Assuming now a  v e c t o r  o f  t a r g e t  p o p u l a t i o n s  a t  
t h e  p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n  T, {!(T)), t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  v e c t o r  t h a t  w i l l  
a s s u r e  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t s  a r e  r e a c h e d  i s  e a s i l y  computed: 
I n  a p p l y i n g  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  c o n t r o l  model (14)  t o  e m p i r i c a l  
d a t a ,  it  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  v e c t o r  makes s e n s e .  For  example ,  i n  a  " p u r e "  i n t e r -  
n a l  m i g r a t i o n  p o l i c y ,  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  sys tem remains  
c o n s t a n t .  An i n m i g r a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  o n e  r e g i o n  i s  a n  o u t -  
m i g r a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a n o t h e r .  The sum o f  i n m i g r a n t s  must 
e q u a l  t h e  o u t m i g r a n t s ,  i . e .  
As a  consequence ,  t h e  pol icy-maker  c a n n o t  s p e c i f y  a  t a r g e t  popu- 
l a t i o n  f o r  a l l  r e g i o n s .  
The p r o c e d u r e  t o  compute t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
a  p u r e  m i g r a t i o n  model i s  d e s c r i b e d  by Rogers  (1 971 , p.  106)  a s  
f o l l o w s .  The m i g r a t i o n  r a t e s  a r e  t a k e n  o u t  o f  t h e  growth m a t r i x  
and t h e  m i g r a t i o n  f l o w s  a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  v i a  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r .  
The new growth m a t r i x  i s  S ,  s a y .  A f t e r  computing im) by ( 1 9 )  
w i t h  t h e  g rowth  m a t r i x  5 and a  t a r g e t  v e c t o r  C $ ( T ) ) ,  some e l e m e n t s  
o f  Cm) a r e  a d j u s t e d  such  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  (20)  h o l d s ,  and a  
r e v i s e d  t a r g e t  v e c t o r  i s  c a l c u l a t e d .  The c o n s t r a i n t s  p l a c e d  on 
t h e  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s  make t h e  sys tem ( 1 4 )  u n c o n t r o l l a b l e ;  i . e . ,  
any t a r g e t  p o p u l a t i o n  c a n n o t  be  r e a c h e d .  The problem,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
i s  t o  f i n d  a  v e c t o r  {a) which, g i v e n  t h e  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 4 )  and t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 0 ) ,  b r i n g s  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a t  
t h e  h o r i z o n  T  a s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  t a r g e t  p o p u l a t i o n  { B ( T ) )  a s  p o s s i -  
b l e .  T h i s  p o l i c y  problem may be e x p r e s s e d  a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  problem: 
*The sys tem { ~ ( t  + 1 )  1  = ~ { & ( t ) )  + ~ C g ( t )  1  i s  s a i d  t o  be  c o n t r o l -  
l a b l e  i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  c o n t r o l  { g ( t ) }  t h a t  t r a n s f e r s  
any i n i t i a l  s t a t e  { ~ ( t " ) )  a t  t i m e  to t o  any a r b i t r a r y  f i n a l  s t a t e  
- 
{ ~ ( t ~ )  - 1 a t  any t i m e  t l  > to (Wolovich, 1974,  p .  6 5 ) .  I n  e q u a t i o n  
(1 4) ~ C u ( t )  ) = { E l .  
- - - 
min { K ( T ) )  - - { K ( T ) )  - 
P o l i c y  model ( 1 9 )  and some of i t s  v a r i a n t s  have been a p p l i e d  by 
Drewe (1 971 ) i n  a  f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d y  of  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
p o l i c y  i n  The N e t h e r l a n d s .  
An i n t e r e s t i n g  e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  above p o l i c y  model f o l l o w s  
from r e l a x a t i o n  o f  t h e  assumpt ion  of a  f i x e d  p o l i c y  v e c t o r .  
I f  t h e  d e g r e e  o r  l e v e l  o f  a  p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  may d e c l i n e  o v e r  
t i m e ,  t h e n  t h e  v e c t o r  i s  added o n l y  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g ,  and 
w{@} i s  added d u r i n g  t h e  n e x t  t i m e  p e r i o d  (0  < w < 1 ) ;  i . e . ,  
w i t h  w  b e i n g  a  s c a l a r .  The c o n t r o l  a t  a  c e r t a i n  t i m e  p e r i o d  t 
i s  a  c o n s t a n t  f r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  t i m e  
p e r i o d .  I n  o t h e r  words,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  de-  
c r e a s e s  e x p o n e n t i a l l y  o v e r  t i m e .  The impact o f  a n  i n i t i a l  p o l i c y  {g) on t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  growth p a t h  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
and 
P r e m u l t i p l y i n g  b o t h  s i d e s  by (wI - G )  y i e l d s  
- - 
whence 
Assuming a  t a r g e t  v e c t o r  { K ( T )  1 ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  
t h a t  a s s u r e s  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t s  o f  t h e  t a r g e t s  u n d e r  t h i s  p o l i c y  
r e g i m e  i s  
The p o l i c y  mode l  ( 1 4 )  may b e  e x t e n d e d  a  s t e p  f u r t h e r  
( W i l l e k e n s ,  1976b ,  pp.  6 9 - 7 1 ) .  I n s t e a d  o f  a s s u m i n g  a  c o n s t a n t  
r e l a t i v e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r ,  s u p p o s e  
t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  a t  e a c h  t i m e  p e r i o d  i s  a  l i n e a r  combina-  
t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  a t  t h e  p r e v i o u s  t i m e  p e r i o d ,  i .e .  
a n d  
w h e r e  W i s  assumed t o  b e  n o n s i n g u l a r .  I n t r o d u c i n g  ( 2 8 )  i n t o  ( 1 4 )  
a n d  s o l v i n g  y i e l d s  
The c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  t i m e  p e r i o d  y i e l d i n g  a  t a r g e t  
p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  { E ( T )  a t  h o r i z o n  T  may b e  computed  e a s i l y .  
N o t e  t h a t  e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 8 )  a n d  ( 2 5 )  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s  o f  
( 2 9 ) .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  c o n s t a n t  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r ,  t h e  m a t r i x  W i s  
a n  i d e n t i t y  m a t r i x .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a n  e x p o n e n t i a l l y  d e c l i n i n g  
c o n t r o l  v e c t o r ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  W i s  a  s c a l a r  m a t r i x ,  i . e .  
- 
W = wI .  
- - 
The p o l i c y  m o d e l s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  h a v e  a n  i n t e r -  
e s t i n g  common f e a t u r e .  S i n c e  t h e  m a t r i c e s  a n d  W a r e  assumed 
t o  b e  t i m e - i n v a r i a n t ,  t h e  m a t r i x  sum i n  ( 2 9 )  d e p e n d s  o n l y  o n  t h e  
p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n  T. L e t  
then equation (29) may be written for t = T as 
{K - (TI 1 = - G ~ { K  - (01 I + A(T) {i1 - , 
where 
(5 (TI 1 is the population distribution at time T, 
{g(O) 1 is the initial population distribution, 
is the control vector in the initial time period. 
Hence, although a population policy is implemented in each time 
period, the population trajectory is completely determined once 
the control vector in the base year is fixed. The dynamic, 
multiperiod population policy problem reduces therefore to a 
single-period problem. Policy models, where the control at t 
is a fixed linear combination of the control vector in the ini- 
tial period, have been called i n i t i a l  p e r i o d  c o n t r o l  m o d e l s  
(Willekens, 1976b, p. 69). In the next section, we will drop 
the constraint on the control vector and introduce the possi- 
bility of intervening in population redistribution by applying 
economic policy instruments. 
Elaboration of the Matrix Model of Population Control 
The expansion of the above matrix model and its variants 
to a complete dynamic policy problem would involve (Willekens, 
1976b, Ch. 3) : 
- Introducing economic control variables and the specifi- 
cation of their impact on the population distribution. 
- Dropping the stringent constraints on the control vector, 
i.e., the extension of the initial period control problem 
tc a truly dynamic control problem. 
- Allowing for other constraints on both the state and the 
control variables, and for formulations of the policy 
objectives other than in terms of targets. 
Introduction of Non-Demographic Control Variables 
It was stressed in the introduction that a fundamental 
feature of population policy is that it does not occur in a 
vacuum. The ultimate goals of demographic intervention are non- 
demographic in nature, and the instruments are socio-economic. 
Policy models must reflect this connection. The first link 
between population policy and socio-economic policy lies in the 
instruments. Policy-makers usually do not directly alter the 
volume of migration in order to mold a population distribution 
i n t o  a  d e s i r e d  p a t t e r n .  R a t h e r ,  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  i n d i r e c t ,  
t h r o u g h  economic v a r i a b l e s  such  a s  r e g i o n a l  income, employment, 
h o u s i n g ,  government  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  and s o  on.  T h e r e f o r e ,  i s  
a  v e c t o r  of  socio-economic c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s ,  and t h e  i m p a c t s  
of  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  on t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e  n e x t  
t i m e  p e r i o d  i s  g i v e n  by v e c t o r  f u n c t i o n  
For  t h e  s a k e  of  s i m p l i c i t y ,  we w i l l  assume a  l i n e a r  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p ,  
s a y ,  where B i s  a  t i m e - i n v a r i a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t  m a t r i x  o f  d imens ion  
N x K ,  where N i s  t h e  d imens ion  o f  I@} and hence t h e  d imens ion  
o f  t h e  s t a t e  v e c t o r  ( e . g .  number o f  r e g i o n s ) ,  and K i s  t h e  dimen- 
s i o n  o f  {Cj} o r  t h e  number of i n s t r u m e n t s .  An e lement  bii d e n o t e s  
t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  j - t h  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e  on t h e  i - t h  e lement  o f  
C i j 3 .  The r a t i o  -bii/bik i s  t h e  amount by which t h e  j - t h  i n s t r u -  
ment may b e  c u t  down w i t h o u t  chang ing  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  i - t h  
e lement  of  { g ) ,  i f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  k - th  i n s t r u m e n t  i s  i n c r e a s e d  
w i t h  one  u n i t .  I t  is ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  m a r g i n a l  r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u -  
t i o n  between t h e  two i n s t r u m e n t s  (Fromm and Taubman, 1968, p .  1 0 9 ) .  
I n t r o d u c i n g  ( 3 2 )  i n t o  ( 1 4 )  g i v e s  
E q u a t i o n  ( 3 3 )  r e l a t e s  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  a  c e r t a i n  
t i m e  p e r i o d  t o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  t i m e  
p e r i o d  and t o  socio-economic p o l i c i e s .  S i n c e  C i j 3  may c o n t a i n  
l a g g e d  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e s ,  t h e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  o f  e a r l i e r  p o l i c i e s  
may be  i n c l u d e d .  I f  I!} h a s  no l agged  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  B c o i n c i d e s  
w i t h  what i s  known i n  economics  a s  t h e  m a t r i x  of  impac t  m u l t i -  
p l i e r s  o r  t h e  m a t r i x  m u l t i p l i e r .  The m a t r i x  m u l t i p l i e r  p l a y s  
a  p i v o t a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  s t u d y  of  t h e  c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  of  dynamic 
sys tems  ( W i l l e k e n s ,  1976b, Ch. 2 ;  Aoki ,  1 9 7 6 ) .  
At t h i s  p o i n t ,  two remarks  a r e  i n  o r d e r :  
- I f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  i s  p u r e l y  demographic ,  t h e n  
( 3 3 )  r e d u c e s  t o  t h e  b a s i c  m a t r i x  model o f  p o p u l a t i o n  
c o n t r o l  o r  i t s  v a r i a n t s .  I n  t h e  b a s i c  model Crij} = CE3 
and t h e  m a t r i x  m u l t i p l i e r  is  a  d i a g o n a l  m a t r i x .  I n  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  model w i t h  e x p o n e n t i a l l y  d e c l i n i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  
R r e d u c e s  t o  a  s c a l a r  m a t r i x .  However, t h i s  m a t r i x  is  
no l o n g e r  t i m e - i n v a r i a n t .  
- The p o l i c y  problem r e p r e s e n t e d  by ( 3 3 )  is  s t i l l  a n  i n i t i a l  
p e r i o d  c o n t r o l  problem. I t  i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
s t a t i c  p o l i c y  model deve loped  by T inbergen  (19631,  i n  
which { ~ ( t  + 1 ) )  = { y )  is  t h e  v e c t o r  of  t a r g e t  v a r i a b l e s  
and { ~ ( t ) }  = { z )  i s  e h e  v e c t o r  of u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  exogenous 
v a r i a b l e s :  
The T i n b e r g e n  p o l i c y  model i s  t h e r e f o r e  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  ( 3 3 )  
i n  which t h e r e  i s  o n l y  one t i m e  p e r i o d .  A s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 3 4 )  
e x i s t s  i f  t h e  r a n k  o f  B i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  number o f  t a r g e t s .  The 
s o l u t i o n  is  u n i q u e  i f  B i s  n o n s i n g u l a r ,  o r ,  i n  t h e  words o f  
T i n b e r g e n ,  i f  t h e  number o f  i n s t r u m e n t s  is  e q u a l  t o  t h e  number 
o f  t a r g e t s .  Then, 
The M u l t i p e r i o d  C o n t r o l  Problem 
The p o l i c y  models  c o n s i d e r e d  t h u s  f a r  a r e  n o t  r e a l l y  dynamic. 
Al though t h e r e  i s  a  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  f o r  e a c h  t i m e  p e r i o d ,  t h e  t r a -  
j e c t o r y  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l s  i s  f i x e d  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  freedom t h e  
pol icy-maker  h a s  is  i n  choos ing  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  
t i m e  p e r i o d .  Once t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n t r o l s  a r e  chosen ,  f u t u r e  v a l u e s  
o f  t h e  c o n t r o l s ,  and hence of  t h e  s t a t e  v a r i a b l e s ,  f o l l o w  a u t o -  
m a t i c a l l y .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  assumpt ion  o f  dependency o f  
c o n t r o l s  is  dropped .  The s t a t e  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 3 )  becomes 
The s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  t r u l y  dynamic p o l i c y  model is  
From t h e  model (36)  and i t s  s o l u t i o n  ( 3 7 ) ,  two m u l t i p e r i o d  
p o l i c y  problems may b e  d e r i v e d :  
- The h o r i z o n - o r i e n t e d  p o l i c y  problem may be  f o r m u l a t e d  
a s  f o l l o w s :  g i v e n  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  { g ( O ) )  and t h e  
assumpt ion  o f  t i m e - i n v a r i a n c e  of  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  m a t r i c e s ,  
which sequence o f  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r s  { ~ ( i ) )  e n s u r e s  t h a t  a  
t a r g e t  v e c t o r  a t  a  p r e d e f i n e d  h o r i z o n  T  w i l l  be  r e a c h e d ?  
- In a trajectory-oriented policy, the question is whether 
there exists a sequence of control vectors {~(i)} such 
that, for a given initial condition and for time-invari- 
ant coefficient matrices, any sequence of target vectors 
CE(t) - 1 can be realized. 
In mathematical systems theory, the first policy problem is known 
as state controllability (Wolovich, 1974). The second problem 
will be denoted as complete state controllability. 
Both policy problems will now be treated in formal terms. 
Horizon-Oriented Policy: Equation (37) may be written for 
t = T a s  
= D C Q ~  , 
- - 
say . (39) 
The system (39) is state controllable if the N x KT matrix Q is 
of rank N, where N is the dimension of the target vector {E(T)~ 
(Wolovich, 1974, p. 65). If D is nonsingular, there is a unique 
control sequence, which is given by 
In the dynamic policy model (36) and (39), it is the combined 
magnitude of the number of instruments and the planning horizon 
that determines state controllability. Any target vector may be 
reached by only one instrument (K = 1) provided the planning 
horizon is not less than N and certain other conditions hold 
(Preston, 1974, p. 70). Also, any set of targets may be reached 
in only one time period if the policy-maker can manipulate at 
least N instruments.* 
*This is exactly the controllability condition derived by 
Tinbergen (1963) for a static policy model. For t = 1 ,  D 
coincides with B. 
- 
Trajectory-Oriented Policy: The policy problem discussed 
in the previous section dealt with the existence of a sequence 
of control vectors, necessary for the achievement of the desired 
target vector at a predefined planning horizon. In practice, 
policy-makers would be interested not only in achieving desired 
target values, but also in keeping them on some desired trajec- 
tory once achieved, or in achieving the targets along a desired 
path. It is not uncommon in politics that short-term objectives 
conflict with long-term goals: long-term goals may become un- 
attainable because of short-term policies. Consequently, not 
only is the state at the planning horizon of interest, but also 
the trajectory. It is, therefore, relevant to consider the 
policy problem in which targets are formulated at each time 
period. 
Writing (38) for each time period gives 
I s 1  = F{{1 - , say . 
The system (41) is controllable if the NT x KT matrix F is 
of rank NT (for T < N). If F is nonsingular, then there exists 
a unique control sequence: 
Note that horizon-oriented policy problems form a special case 
of the trajectory-oriented policy problem. If, in (41 1 , {Y, (t) 1 
is not predefined for t = 1, ..., T-1, then it reduces to (38), 
i.e. the horizon-oriented policy problem. Therefore, complete 
state controllability implies state controllability. 
The computation of the unique policy sequence is straight- 
forward once the existence of such a policy is demonstrated. 
But what if F (or Q or B) is singular? In this case, there may 
be an infinite number of control sequences that give the desired 
v a l u e s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  v e c t o r s ;  o r  t h e r e  may be  no c o n t r o l  sequence  
a t  a l l  t h a t  r e a c h e s  t h e  t a r g e t s .  Two c a s e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g .  
( i )  Case 1 :  NT < KT 
I f  F i s  r e c t a n g u l a r  and o f  r ank  NT, t h e  number o f  c o n t r o l s  
e x e r c i s e d ,  KT, e x c e e d s  t h e  number o f  t a r g e t s  s p e c i f i e d ,  NT. 
Consequen t ly ,  t h e r e  a r e  an i n f i n i t e  number of  s o l u t i o n s  t o  ( 4 2 )  
a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a n  i n f i n i t e  number of c o n t r o l  sequences  t h a t  
l e a d  t o  t h e  p r e d e f i n e d  t a r g e t s .  A l l  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  t o  (42)  may 
b e  e x p r e s s e d  u s i n g  t h e  n o t i o n  of  a  g e n e r a l i z e d  i n v e r s e .  I f  & ( ' )  
(1 i s  a  g e n e r a l i z e d  i n v e r s e  of  F ,  s a t i s f y i n g  F F & = &, and i f  { c >  i s  a n  a r b i t r a r y  v e c t o r  of d imens ion  KT, t h e n  t h e  g e n e r a l  
s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 4 2 )  i s  (Rogers ,  1971, p .  258) 
Out o f  t h e  i n f i n i t e  number o f  f e a s i b l e  c o n t r o l  s e q u e n c e s ,  
t h e  pol icy-maker  must  choose  a  s i n g l e  one.  I n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  a  
u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 4 2 ) ,  he  may f o r c e  t h e  number o f  i n s t r u m e n t s  
e x e r c i s e d ,  KT, t o  be  e q u a l  t o  t h e  number o f  t a r g e t s  s p e c i f i e d ,  
NT, by d e l e t i n g  some i n s t r u m e n t  v a r i a b l e s  a t  c e r t a i n  t i m e  p e r i -  
o d s ;  o r  h e  may c o n s t r a i n  t h e  v a l u e s  t h a t  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  v a r i -  
a b l e s  c a n  t a k e  on.  A wide v a r i e t y  o f  p o s s i b l e  c o n s t r a i n t s  e x i s t s ,  
b u t  we c o n s i d e r  o n l y  two c a t e g o r i e s :  l i n e a r  dependency among 
s e v e r a l  i n s t r u m e n t s ,  and d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a c c e p t a b l e  v a l u e s  of  t h e  
i n s t r u m e n t s .  
By making some i n s t r u m e n t s  l i n e a r l y  d e p e n d e n t ,  t h e  freedom 
of  p o l i c y  a c t i o n  i s  reduced  such  t h a t  o n l y  one c o n t r o l  sequence  
i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  t a r g e t s .  An i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
t y p e  of  c o n s t r a i n t  h a s  been g i v e n  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n .  
I n  many c a s e s ,  t h e  pol icy-maker  h a s  a  good i d e a  of  what 
l e v e l s  o f  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  a c c e p t a b l e  p o l i t i c a l l y  and eco-  
n o m i c a l l y .  Minimizing some measure  of  d e v i a t i o n  between t h e  
r e a l i z e d  and t h e  most a c c e p t a b l e  v a l u e s  a s s u r e s  a u n i q u e  sequence  
of i n s t r u m e n t  v e c t o r s .  For  example ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
t r a c k i n g  problem may y i e l d  a  u n i q u e  c o n t r o l  sequence :  
In equation (45), the objective is to minimize the sum of the 
squared deviations between {g(t)) and an acceptable or desired 
control vector at time t, {[(t)). It is a simple linear quadratic 
control problem. 
The use of a quadratic objective function with linear con- 
straints is common in economic policy analysis.* It is based on 
two assumptions: that the policy-maker's preferences are qua- 
dratic, and that each of the targets depends linearly on all of 
the instruments, the coefficients of these linear relations 
being fixed and known. 
If the number of targets specified exceeds the number of 
instruments exercised, the system (42) is inconsistent, and not 
all the target values can be reached. This poses an additional 
decision problem for the policy-maker. Does he give up some 
targets in order to reach others, or does he want to approximate 
all of the targets as closely as possible? In the latter case, 
we again have a tracking problem, but now in the state variables 
instead of in the controls. A policy model analogous to (45) 
may be formulated as follows: 
A combination of tracking problems (45) and (46) leads to 
the dual tracking problem. Desirable values are given for the 
trajectories of both the state and the control variables. Some 
extensions of the dual tracking problem are given by Willekens 
(1 976b, pp. 98-1 01 ) . 
The Generalized Dynamic Policy Problem 
In the policy problems considered thus far, it was assumed 
that the policy-maker's preference system could be expressed 
completely in terms of target values for the state variables, 
*Theills quadratic programming model for static and dynamic 
policy analysis (Theil, 1964, pp. 34-35 and Ch. 4; Friedman, 
1975, pp. 158-160) is frequently used, as is the linear-quadratic 
control model (Sengupta, 1970; Pindyck, 1973a, 1973b; Vishwakarma, 
1974; Garbade, 1975; Chow, 1972, 1975, Ch. 9). The linear qua- 
dratic control model is particularly successful in applied prob- 
lems of quantitative economic stabilization policy. 
and that the achievement of these targets was constrained only 
by the "law of motion" or state equation describing the dynamic 
behavior of the system. The advantage of this formulation of the 
policy problem is that its solution can be investigated analyti- 
cally. It has been shown that the existence of a control vector, 
or of a sequence of control vectors, ensuring achievement of the 
targets is determined by the rank of the matrix multipliers B ,  
D or F. In other words, the ranks of the matrix multipliers 
determine the controllability of the dynamic demo-economic system. 
Once the existence of a feasible policy has been demonstrated, 
the computation of the control vector, or sequence of control 
vectors, is straightforward. The design of an optimal policy 
is particularly simple if the matrix multiplier is nonsingular. 
In this case, only one feasible combination of controls exists: 
the optimal combination. 
In the previous sections, no direct constraints were imposed 
on the state variables. The control variables were constrained 
in a very simple way; namely, through the introduction of linear 
dependency. In this section, we expand the possible constraints, 
thus reducing the set of feasible control vectors. In addition, 
more realistic policy objectives are discussed. 
In practical policy-making, the values that the state and 
control vectors can take on are restricted by political, economic, 
and social considerations. For example, it is politically un- 
acceptable for the values of policy instruments to fluctuate 
heavily from one period to another. To remedy possible problems 
of instrument instability, Holbrook (1972, p. 57) proposes to 
include the instruments in the policy-maker's preference function. 
Each element of the control vector also may be required to lie 
within a lower and an upper boundary: 
Population policy is not cost-free; imposing controls implies 
the incurring of costs. It is, therefore, natural to assume a 
budget constraint that limits the action space of the policy- 
maker. We distinguish between a budget constraint for each 
period : 
and a global budget constraint: 
The c o s t  v e c t o r  { c ( t ) } '  c o n t a i n s  t h e  u n i t  c o s t s  o f  e a c h  
i n s t r u m e n t .  - 
C o n s t r a i n t s  ( 4 7 )  t o  ( 4 9 )  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r .  
F r e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  s t a t e  v e c t o r  i t s e l f ,  i . e .  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n ,  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r .  For  
example ,  t h e  pol icy-maker  may want t o  p u t  upper  and lower  l i m i t s  
on  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  e a c h  r e g i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  t h e  s o c i a l  
c o s t s  of  e x c e s s i v e  d e n s i t y  o r  of d e p o p u l a t i o n .  Other  c o n s t r a i n t s  
on t h e  s t a t e  v e c t o r  may be  f o r m u l a t e d .  The g e n e r a l  fo rmula  ex-  
p r e s s i n g  c o n s t r a i n t s  on s t a t e  and/or  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r s  i s  g i v e n  by 
e q u a t i o n  ( 3 ) .  U s u a l l y ,  however,  such  c o n s t r a i n t s  t a k e  t h e  form 
of  a  s e t  of  l i n e a r  i n e q u a l i t i e s .  Toge ther  w i t h  t h e  boundary 
c o n d i t i o n s  and t h e  s t a t e  e q u a t i o n s  t h e s e  d e l i n e a t e  t h e  f e a s i b l e  
s e t  of c o n t r o l s  o u t  of  which an o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  v e c t o r  o r  c o n t r o l  
sequence  may b e  chosen  a c c o r d i n g  t o  an o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ,  q u a d r a t i c  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  have 
been c o n s i d e r e d .  O t h e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of  f o r m a l  p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  
problems w i t h  q u a d r a t i c  o b j e c t i v e s  and l i n e a r  c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e  
g i v e n  by Evtushenko and MacKinnon (1 975)  and by Mehra (1 975)  . 
I f  c o n s t r a i n t s  and o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  b o t h  l i n e a r ,  t h e  p o l i c y  model 
t a k e s  t h e  f o r m a t  of a  dynamic l i n e a r  programming problem ( P r o p o i  
and W i l l e k e n s ,  1977) . 
The most  g e n e r a l  f o r m u l a t i o n  of a  dynamic p o l i c y  problem i s  
p r e s e n t e d  by e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 )  t o  ( 7 )  of t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of t h i s  
p a p e r .  N e i t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s  n o r  o b j e c t i v e s  need t a k e  s i m p l e  
l i n e a r  o r  q u a d r a t i c  fo rms .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  however,  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s  
a r e  adop ted  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  t a s k  of f i n d i n g  t h e  
optimum. S o l u t i o n  a l g o r i t h m s  f o r  dynamic m a t h e m a t i c a l  program- 
ming o r  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  problems a r e  beyond t h e  scope  of t h i s  
p a p e r .  D e s c r i p t i o n s  and n u m e r i c a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  may b e  found i n  
t e x t b o o k s ,  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  of Bryson and Ho ( 1 9 6 9 ) ,  McReynolds 
(19701, and Noton (1 9 7 2 ) .  
THEORETICALLY-ORIENTED POLICY MODELS 
T h e o r e t i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d  p o l i c y  models have been deve loped  t o  
g a i n  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of a n  o p t i m a l  demo-economic 
system.  Most o r i g i n a t e d  i n  economics ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  f i e l d  
o f  economic growth t h e o r y .  T h e i r  main c o n c e r n  i s  t h e  s t u d y  of  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e ,  u n i q u e n e s s ,  s t a b i l i t y ,  and e f f i c i e n c y  p r o p e r t i e s  
of e q u i l i b r i u m  growth  p a t h s  (McNicol l ,  1975, p .  6 5 1 ) .  
The b a s i c  f o r m a t  of  t h e s e  models i s  t h a t  o f  a n  o p t i m a l  con- 
t r o l  problem,  a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  e q u a t i o n s  ( 1 )  t o  ( 7 ) .  As i n  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ,  we w i l l  b e g i n  o u r  e x p o s i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  s i m p l e  
economic growth model t h a t  u n d e r l i e s  most t h e o r e t i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d  
p o l i c y  mode l s ,  t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  g rowth  model,  and t h e n  g r a d u a l l y  
b u i l d  up p o l i c y  models o f  g r e a t e r  c o m p l e x i t y .  
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  demographic g rowth ,  t h e r e  i s  no u n i q u e  
i n d i c a t o r  t h a t  measures  economic g rowth .  Gross  p r o d u c t  o r  o u t -  
p u t ,  v a l u e  added,  consumption,  and o t h e r  s u c h  v a r i a b l e s  a l l  have  
been u s e d .  C o n s i d e r ,  f o r  example ,  t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  
The o u t p u t  of a  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n .  U s u a l l y ,  o n l y  two p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  
c a p i t a l  and l a b o r .  The p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  may be  
e x p r e s s e d  a s  
where K ( t )  d e n o t e s  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  a t  t i m e  t ,  and L ( t )  i s  t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  s t o c k  of  l a b o r .  
I n  a  w e l l - d e f i n e d  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  g rowth  o f  t o t a l  o u t -  
p u t  i s  u n i q u e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  g rowth  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  of  pro-  
d u c t i o n .  Solow (1956)  s u g g e s t e d  s i m p l e  h y p o t h e s e s  a b o u t  t h e  
deve lopment  of  f a c t o r  endowments t h a t  c l o s e  t h e  s y s t e m  and e n a b l e  
a  s t u d y  of  t h e  growth p a t h  g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  model economy. Meade 
(1  961 ) and Swan (1  956) i n d e p e n d e n t l y  deve loped  s i m i l a r  models  
l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  same c o n c l u s i o n s .  T h e i r  model i s  known a s  t h e  
n e o c l a s s i c a l  o r  Solow-Swan growth model.  
Assume a  n e o c l a s s i c a l  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  and a  growth 
p a t h  of  c a p i t a l  l a b o r  obey ing  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  L ( t )  grows a t  a  c o n s t a n t  r e l a t i v e  
r a t e  n ,  which i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  g rowth  r a t e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  and 
is g i v e n  exogenous ly :  
The l a b o r  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  i s  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e q u a t i o n  i n  (51 ) : 
Second, a  c o n s t a n t  f r a c t i o n  s of  t h e  t o t a l  o u t p u t  f l o w  Q ( t )  i s  
saved  and a l l  t h e  s a v i n g s  a r e  i n v e s t e d  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  K ( t ) .  
Assuming moreover t h a t  c a p i t a l  d o e s  n o t  d e p r e c i a t e ,  t h e  g rowth  
o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  is  g i v e n  by t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  f u n c t i o n :  
The growth of the output is 
where dK(t)/dt and dL(t)/dt are given by (51) and (53) respec- 
tively. Note that this growth model applies only to an economy 
in full employment. The labor supply is completely inelastic. 
The labor supply curve is a vertical line that shifts to the 
right over time as the quantity of labor increases. Wages have 
no impact on labor supply or on labor demand. The real wage 
rate, or equivalently the marginal productivity of labor, adjusts 
at each time period so that all available labor is employed. 
If there is unemployment, the wage rate should fall. Labor 
becomes cheaper and induces a substitution of labor for capital. 
This lowers the capital-labor ratio until full employment is 
restored. 
Inserting (50) and (52) in (53) gives 
This is the basic equation determining the time path of capital 
accumulation that must be followed for full employment to be 
maintained. For each time t, the supply of labor and capital is 
inelastic. Labor is given by (52) and the capital stock is a 
result of previous accumulation. All labor and capital that 
exist at t will be fully employed. This is brought about by an 
adjustment of the marginal productivities. For each t, the out- 
put may be computed by the production function. How much of the 
output will be saved and reinvested is given by (54). This in- 
vestment adds to the capital stock of the next period. 
In the Solow-Swan model of economic growth, the possibility 
of factor substitution assures that full employment is maintained. 
The burden of adjustment falls on the marginal productivities of 
capital and labor, or equivalently, on the marginal capital- 
output ratio. To study the relationship between the time path of 
capital accumulation and population growth, we express the capital 
stock at time t as 
where k is the capital-labor ratio, defined as k = K(t)/L(t). 
Differentiating both sides of (55) gives 
S u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  ( 5 2 )  i n  ( 5 6 )  g i v e s  
d K ( t )  - dk L ent + knLoe n t  
d t - d t  0  
Equa t ing  ( 5 7 )  t o  ( 5 4 )  y i e l d s  
[g + kn] ~ ~ e ~ ~  = SF [ K ( t )  , ~ ~ e ~ ~ ]  . 
The p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i s  n e o c l a s s i c a l  w i t h  c o n s t a n t  r e -  
t u r n s  t o  s c a l e .  I f  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  a r e  m u l t i p l i e d  by some 
c o n s t a n t ,  t h e  o u t p u t  i s  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  same c o n s t a n t .  There-  
f o r e ,  we may d i v i d e  b o t h  s i d e s  o f  ( 5 8 )  by i O e n t : * , * *  
The t i m e  p a t h  of  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  d i f f e r -  
e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n :  
The f u n c t i o n  F ( k , l )  i s  t h e  per capita production function. 
I t  i s  t h e  t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  a s  v a r y i n g  amounts k  o f  
c a p i t a l  a r e  employed w i t h  one u n i t  of l a b o r .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  
it g i v e s  t h e  o u t p u t  p e r  worker  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  p e r  worker .  
I t  depends  o n l y  on t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  o r  c a p i t a l - o u t p u t  r a t i o  
b e c a u s e  of  c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e .  E q u a t i o n  ( 5 9 )  shows t h a t  
t h e  g rowth  r a t e  of  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  ( d k / d t ) / k  i s  e q u a l  t o  
t h e  growth r a t e  of  c a p i t a l ,  o r  t h e  r a t e  of c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n  
s F ( k , l ) / k ,  minus t h e  growth r a t e  o f  l a b o r ,  n .  Note t h a t  k / F ( k , l )  
* I f  t h e r e  a r e  no c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e ,  we must  c o n s i d e r  
( 5 0 )  and ( 5 2 )  d i r e c t l y  w i t h o u t  t h i s  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n .  
* * I n  t h e  economic l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  
i s  u s u a l l y  d e n o t e d  by f ( k ) .  The n o t a t i o n  F [ k , l l  i s  t o  remind 
t h e  r e a d e r  of t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r  l a b o r .  
is the capital-output ratio, say C. Hence, we may write 
The quantity s/C is the warranted rate of growth (Harrod, 
1970, p. 47). In Harrod's version of the Harrod-Domar model, it 
is the rate of growth of output for which the actual level of 
production coincides with the expected demand. The producer 
produces neither more nor less than the right amount. 
If dk/dt = 0, the capital-labor ratio is constant, and the 
capital stock must be expanding at the same rate as the labor 
force, namely n, to maintain full employment. But this is 
exactly the formulation of the Harrod-Domar consistency condition 
that an economic system must satisfy in order for steady-state 
growth to be possible under a fixed capital-output ratio, a con- 
stant savings rate, and full employment. In Harrod's formula- 
tion, the condition is that the warranted rate of growth equals 
the natural growth rate n (the growth rate of the population): 
This equilibrium situation is labeled by Robinson (1970, 
p. 133) the golden age, to indicate a steady, smooth growth with 
full employment. In Solow's neoclassical model, the capital 
output ratio is not fixed but changes automatically in response 
to changes in factor supplies (measured by changes in s or n). 
It can be shown that, for any positive s and n satisfying 
there exists a unique positive capital-labor ratio k* such that 
dk*/dt = 0 (Burmeister and Dobell, 1970, p. 25), such that equi- 
librium or steady state is feasible. How the capital-labor 
ratio changes as the system converges to its equilibrium position 
is portrayed in Figure 1. It is the phase diagram for the differ- 
ential equation in (59). 
For any point on the dk/dt curve, there is full employment 
and hence short-run equilibrium. The position of the economy is 
described by k, and its growth by dk/dt. In the long-run equi- 
librium, dk/dt = 0, the capital-labor ratio is constant, and 
capital grows at the same rate as labor. 
Figure 1. Phase diagram for Solow's fundamental differential 
equation (%= sF(k , l )  - nk). 
Source: Burmeistrr and Dobell. 1970. p. 26 
Equations ( 5 9 )  and ( 6 0 )  describe the growth rate of the 
economy in terms of the growth rates of factor supplies. It 
presents the "law of motion" of the economic system. 
In these models, and in various extensions, labor grows at 
a constant rate. To convert the neoclassical growth model ( 5 9 )  
into a complete demo-economic policy model, we may consider a 
number of additions. The first is to drop the assumption of 
exogenously defined labor increase by endogenizing the growth 
rate of labor; the second is the introduction of policy-objectives 
and of other constraints. 
Economic Growth with Population Endogenous 
Classical economists such as Adam Smith viewed population 
size as being positively related to wage level. High wages would 
affect birth and death rates; they would encourage early marriage, 
and hence higher birth rates. In addition, children would become 
more valuable as future workers and as a form of retirement in- 
surance. This would induce parents to take greater care of their 
children, and would thereby diminish the infant death rate. 
Ricardo considered a third factor of production, land, whose 
total supply is fixed. Constant returns to scale are assumed for 
the three factors: land, capital, and labor. Therefore, a pro- 
duction function containing only capital and labor exhibits 
decreasing returns. As did Smith, Ricardo linked population 
growth to wage level. He assumed that there was a subsistence 
wage; if the actual wage fell below the subsistence wage, women 
would adopt a net reproduction rate of less than unity. The con- 
clusion of Ricardo's analysis was that population and the economy 
would approach a stationary state (n = 0), with wages at a sub- 
sistence level. * 
Although Smith and Ricardo both devoted some attention to 
the economics of population growth and indicated that population 
is endogenous to economic growth, Malthus was the first to succeed 
in systemizing a general theory of population. According to 
Malthus, birth rates are biologically determined, but death rates 
are affected by economic conditions. 
The formal treatment of an endogenous population in economic 
growth models is of a more recent date. This section reviews 
some attempts to endogenize the demographic component. In addi- 
tion, it investigates the impact of an endogenously changing 
labor force participation rate and of the explicit consideration 
of consumption. 
The Neoclassical Model with Population Endogenous 
To illustrate how population growth may affect economic 
growth, consider the fundamental equation of the Solow-Swan model 
where the population growth rate is a function of the wage rate 
w (k) , or of per capita income or consumption (Solow, 1970, 
p. 189) : 
Assume that, when the capital-labor ratio k, and hence the wage 
rate w(k), is low, the population is unable to maintain itself, 
and the growth rate of labor is negative. As wages rise, the 
population growth rate increases until the wage rate reaches 
such a level that the wealthy population decides to cut down its 
growth rate. Such a case might be represented by a growth rate 
equation for n [w (k) 1 or n (k) , or by a phase diagram such as 
Figure 2. 
*A production function with decreasing returns to scale is, 
somewhat surprisingly, not a sufficient condition to ensure that 
a stationary population will be approached (Niehans, 1963; Enke, 
1963; Pitchford, 1974, p. 56-70). 
Figure 2. Phase diagram for the Solow-Swan model with populatiorl 
p w t h  endogenous (equation 2 = sF(k.1) - kn(k)). 
Source: Burmeister and Dobell. 19701 p. 37 
A s  F i g u r e  2 shows, t h e r e  i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m u l t i p l e  
e q u i l i b r i a  and hence a l s o  o f  u n s t a b l e  o n e s .  Below t h e  e q u i l i b -  
r ium p o i n t  k** s m a l l  p e r t u r b a t i o n s  o f  k f o r c e  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  
r a t i o  t o  an e q u i l i b r i u m  v a l u e  k*. When t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  
i n c r e a s e s  beyond t h e  u n s t a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  k**, t h e  economy 
i s  on a  p a t h  w i t h  a  p e r p e t u a l l y  r i s i n g  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  and 
hence p e r  c a p i t a  income. 
I n s t e a d  o f  f o c u s i n g  on t h e  wage r a t e ,  one  may make popula -  
t i o n  g rowth  depend on p e r  c a p i t a  income o r  consumption.  I n  h i s  
o r i g i n a l  a r t i c l e ,  Solow (1 970, p .  188)  t r e a t s  t h e s e  e q u i v a l e n t  
c a s e s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  growth e q u a t i o n  becomes 
where 5 d e n o t e s  wages,  p e r  c a p i t a  income, o r  p e r  c a p i t a  consump- 
t i o n .  
I n  t h e  S a t o  and Davis  (1971, p .  881)  model ,  5 d e n o t e s  p e r  
c a p i t a  income y  o r  F ( k , l ) .  The economic dynamics  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
g i v e n  by 
The f u n c t i o n  n ( . )  i s  monotonic ( n '  > 0 ) .  The l o g i s t i c  
growth c u r v e  i n  F i g u r e  3 r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  d e a t h  r a t e  
d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  income and t h a t  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  i n c r e a s e s  up t o  a  
c e r t a i n  l e v e l  of  y  and d e c l i n e s  t h e r e a f t e r .  
Figure 3. Relation between population growth and per capita income. 
The assumpt ion  t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  growth depends on p e r  c a p i t a  
income and t h a t  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  ~ a r t i c i ~ a t i o n  r a t e  i s  c o n s t a n t  
h a s  a l s o  been made by Lane (1 975, p .  5 8 j  and P i t c h f o r d  ( 1  974, 
p .  1 6 7 ) .  
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  t h e r e  h a s  been r e v i v e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  p o p u l a t i o n  
a s  an endogenous v a r i a b l e  i n  economic g rowth  mode l s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
w i t h i n  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n .  The r a t i o n a l e  f o r  
making p o p u l a t i o n  a n  endogenous v a r i a b l e  of  dynamic economic 
g rowth  models  h a s  been g i v e n  by Dasgupta .  H i s  approach  i s  t o  
t r e a t  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n  and p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  a s  i n t e r d e p e n -  
d e n t :  "The economic w e l f a r e  of  a  community i s  a f f e c t e d  by 
p o l i c i e s  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e  ( 1 )  t h e  r a t e  of  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n ;  
and ( 2 )  t h e  r a t e  of  g rowth  o f  p o p u l a t i o n .  A t  any moment o f  t i m e  
t h e  optimum s i z e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  w i l l  depend on t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  and t h e  optimum r a t e  of  s a v i n g s  w i l l  
depend on t h e  e x i s t i n g  number o f  peop le .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e  a  popula-  
t i o n  p o l i c y  c a n n o t  be  f o r m u l a t e d  w i t h o u t  a  c o n c u r r e n t  s a v i n g s  
p o l i c y .  The two must  be  c o n s i d e r e d  t o g e t h e r . "  (Dasgupta ,  1969,  
p. 295 . )  
Population Growth and Labor Force Participation 
An assumption frequently made by authors attempting to 
endogenize population growth in economic models is that labor 
force and population are interchangeable variables. The ratio- 
nale for this is given by Pitchford (1974, p. 55): "If the 
proportional rate of growth of population is constant and has 
been for a long time, it is not unreasonable to assume that a 
fixed ratio between the work force and population has been 
established." In terms of mathematical demography, it means 
that the population is assumed to be stable. In the stable popu- 
lation, the age composition is constant, and hence the population 
in the active age groups is a fixed proportion of the total popu- 
lation: 
where 
L(t) is the labor force, 
N(t) is the population at time t, 
p is the labor force participation rate. 
If population grows at a constant rate n, and p is constant, 
the labor grows at the same rate n. 
In reality, the labor force participation rate is not con- 
stant, but depends on the age composition of the population and 
on economic conditions. We may therefore ask how economic growth 
would be affected if the labor force participation rate varied 
with changes in the economic situation. 
Consider the neoclassical growth model in (59): 
Assume that the labor force participation rate depends on the 
prevailing wage w(k), which depends on the factor shares. The 
labor force at time t then is 
T h e r e f o r e ,  
n t  
d t  dw a 
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 5 9 )  and ( 6 8 )  i n  ( 6 9 )  g i v e s  
where 
z  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  wages,  
zw r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  wages w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o .  
The g rowth  p a t h  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  r e d u c e s  t o  
Balanced g rowth  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  i . e . ,  where d k / d t  = 0, o c c u r s  a s  i n  
t h e  Solow-Swan model.  Convergence t o  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t ,  how- 
e v e r ,  t a k e s  more t i m e .  S i n c e  dp/dw may b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  be  p o s i t i v e ,  
and s i n c e  dw/dk i s  p o s i t i v e ,  z,, and zw a r e  p o s i t i v e ,  making t h e  
denomina to r  o f  ( 7 1 )  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o n e  and t h u s  s lowing  t h e  speed  
of convergence .  T h i s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r i s i n g  wages,  a s s o -  
c i a t e d  w i t h  a  r i s i n g  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o ,  i n d u c e  t h e  e n t r y  of a  
l a r g e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  
The N e o c l a s s i c a l  Model w i t h  Consumption 
I n  t h e  Solow-Swan model ,  t h e  s a v i n g s  r a t e  s was h e l d  con- 
s t a n t .  D i f f e r e n t  v a l u e s  of  s would l e a d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  a l l o c a t i o n s  
of  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  go lden-age  g rowth  p a t h ,  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  d i f f e r -  
e n t  e q u i l i b r i u m  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o s ,  wage r a t e s ,  p e r s o n a l  income 
s t r e a m s ,  and consumption r a t e s .  A l o g i c a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  neo- 
c l a s s i c a l  model ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  t o  i n t r o d u c e  consumption e x p l i c i t l y .  
One may b e g i n  by e x p r e s s i n g  t o t a l  s a v i n g s  a s  
where c  i s  consumption p e r  c a p i t a  and N i s  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  
Assuming a  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  o f  u n i t y ,  i . e .  L = N ,  
and c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n s  t o  s c a l e ,  ( 7 2 )  may b e  w r i t t e n  a s  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 7 3 )  i n  t h e  Solow-Swan growth model i n  ( 5 9 )  g i v e s *  
There  i s  a  d i f f e r e n t  go lden-age  growth p a t h  f o r  e v e r y  k.  
For  a  g i v e n  consumption r a t e  c ,  t h e  s t e a d y - s t a t e  c a p i t a l - o u t p u t  
r a t i o  i s  
where c /k  i s  consumption a s  a  f r a c t i o n  o f  t o t a l  income. On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, f o r  a  g i v e n  c a p i t a l - o u t p u t  r a t i o ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  
c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o ,  t h e  s t e a d y - s t a t e  consumption r a t e  i s  
E q u a t i o n  ( 7 6 )  p r o v i d e s  a  d i r e c t  l i n k  between growth t h e o r y  
and growth p o l i c y .  Al though t h e  r a t e  of  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth ,  n ,  
i s  h e l d  c o n s t a n t ,  one  c a n  d e r i v e  r u l e s  f o r  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n  
* R e c a l l  t h a t  t h i s  i m p l i e s  f u l l  employment and t h a t  a l l  s a v i n g s  
a r e  i n v e s t e d .  
that may be compared with those obtained with different rates of 
population growth. In addition, (76) or (74) show up as con- 
straints in a number of demo-economic optimization models. 
Optimization and policy considerations come in when both 
per capita consumption and the capital-labor ratio are allowed 
to vary. The relevant policy question is: what steady-state 
capital-labor ratio is able to sustain a maximum per capita 
consumption? The first-order condition for maximizing per capita 
consumption is 
where 
is the marginal product of capital. This means that the interest 
rate equals the rate of labor force growth. The capital output- 
ratio maximizing c will be denoted k*. 
Equation (77) is the golden rule of capital accumulation. 
It has been discovered independently by Swan (1956) and by Phelps 
(1961; see also 1970, p. 198), and was already implicit in Ramsey's 
(1928) work. Among all the possible golden-age paths of natural 
growth, that golden age is "best" which practices the golden rule: 
the investment made by each generation is such that the next 
generation has the highest possible per capita consumption. Under 
the golden rule, the relative share of output going to capital is 
the optimal savings ratio 
k*F ' (k*, 1 ) = k*n 
S = 
F(k*,l) F(k*,l) - 
(See also Burmeister and Dobell, 1970, pp. 49-53.) Therefore, 
the savings rate that maximizes per capita consumption in the 
long run is equal to the share of profit in national income. 
The golden-rule consumption per head is given by 
c *  = ~ ( k * , l )  - nk* . ( 7 9 )  
How d o e s  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  n  a f f e c t  c *  
( P h e l p s ,  1966, pp. 1 7 8 ) ?  I f  k* > 0, an i n c r e a s e  o f  n  l e a d s  t o  
a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  F '  (k*,  1  ) , by ( 7 7 )  . But F '  (k* ,  1  ) i s  d e c r e a s i n g  
i n  k ,  s o  k* w i l l  d e c r e a s e ,  which i m p l i e s  a  d e c l i n e  i n  p e r  c a p i t a  
o u t p u t  F ( k * , l ) .  The n e t  e f f e c t  upon c *  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  n  may be  
found by d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  ( 7 9 )  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  n .  T h i s  y i e l d s :  
which,  a f t e r  a p p l y i n g  ( 7 7 ) ,  g i v e s :  
T h e r e f ~ r e ,  t h e  g o l d e n - r u l e  p e r  c a p i t a  consumption d e c l i n e s  a s  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  rises,  and t h e  lower  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
g rowth  r a t e ,  t h e  b e t t e r .  
I n  P h e l p s '  model p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  i s  g i v e n  exogenous ly .  
Davis  (1969)  h a s  e x t e n d e d  t h e  model t o  a l l o w  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
g rowth  r a t e  t o  v a r y  w i t h  p e r  c a p i t a  income, i . e .  n  = n [ F ( k , l )  1 .  
When p o p u l a t i o n  grows endogenous ly ,  t h e  g o l d e n - r u l e  s a v i n g s  r a t e  
i s  no l o n g e r  e q u a l  t o  (78)  b u t  i s  modi f ied  t o  
The r a t i o  
i s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s h a r e  o f  o u t p u t  g o i n g  t o  c a p i t a l .  Whether t h e  
modi f i ed  g o l d e n - r u l e  s a v i n g s  r a t e  i s  g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  s h a r e  o f  c a p i t a l  is  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  s i g n  o f  n ' ( . ) .  
C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,  t h e  growth r a t e  o f  t h e  economy under  endogenous 
l a b o r  s u p p l y  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o r  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
of c a p i t a l ,  depend ing  upon whe ther  n l ( . )  i s  n e g a t i v e  o r  p o s i t i v e . *  
A p o s i t i v e  n ' ( . )  i m p l i e s  a  monotonic  f u n c t i o n  d e s c r i b i n g  a  p o s i -  
t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  and p e r  
c a p i t a  income. 
P o p u l a t i o n  growth and c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  
by s i m p l e  a g g r e g a t e  models .  I n  t h e  models o f  economic growth 
d i s c u s s e d  s o  f a r ,  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  a r e  assumed t o  b e  homogeneous. 
A few growth models have f o c u s e d  on a  d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  
p o p u l a t i o n  by age .  Samuelson (1958,  1975)  and A r t h u r  and McNicoll  
(1 977, 1978)  have  shown how t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a g e  g r o u p s  a f f e c t s  
t h e  optimum r a t e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth .  I n  t h e  a g g r e g a t e d  v e r s i o n  
o f  t h e  g rowth  model,  g i v e n  by ( 7 4 ) ,  a  s m a l l  p o p u l a t i o n  growth 
r a t e  i s  p r e f e r a b l e ,  s i n c e  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  c a l l s  
f o r  a  g r e a t e r  i n v e s t m e n t  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o ,  o r  
c a p i t a l  p e r  head.  T h i s  c a p i t a l  widening d i v e r t s  r e s o u r c e s  f rom 
consumption and from c a p i t a l  deepen ing  ( i n c r e a s e  i n  c a p i t a l  p e r  
h e a d ) .  Samuelson (1958)  h a s  shown t h a t  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a g i n g  
w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r a n s f e r s  between a g e  g r o u p s  may a l t e r  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n .  W e  w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  a g e - s p e c i f i c  demo-economic 
p o l i c y  models  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
Optimum Demo-Economic Growth 
H e r e t o f o r e ,  we have i n v e s t i g a t e d  s e v e r a l  models  o f  demo- 
economic g rowth  and t h e i r  s t e a d y - s t a t e  p r o p e r t i e s .  P o l i c y  o b j e c -  
t i v e s  were  i n t r o d u c e d  t o  s e l e c t  a  u n i q u e  s t e a d y - s t a t e  o r  go lden-  
a g e  g rowth  p a t h .  The f o c u s  was n o t  o n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  t h e m s e l v e s ,  
b u t  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  a  un ique  s t e a d y  s t a t e .  
The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of t h e s e  models  i n t o  t r u l y  dynamic demo- 
economic p o l i c y  models r e q u i r e s :  
- The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  an e x p l i c i t  p o p u l a t i o n  c o n t r o l  
v a r i a b l e ;  
- The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  e x p l i c i t  intertempora 2 p o l i c y  o b j  ec -  
t i v e s .  T h i s  i n v o l v e s  problems of d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
w e l f a r e  c r i t e r i o n  and o f  t h e  s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t ;  
- An a l l o w a n c e  f o r  o t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s  on b o t h  t h e  s t a t e  
and c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s  ( t h i s  w i l l  n o t  b e  s t u d i e d  h e r e ) ;  
- A more r e a l i s t i c  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  sys tem 
by i n t r o d u c i n g  a g e  s p e c i f i c i t y .  
* I t  i s  assumed t h a t  [ l  - k*n'  ( . )  ] > 0.  
These requirements will be dealt with below. 
The Po~ulation Control Variable 
In the models considered thus far, population was treated 
exogenously or endogenously, but was not considered as a direct 
policy variable. The problem was to determine the optimal 
capital-labor ratio or the savings rate for a given population 
growth rate. Recall, for example, the golden rule of capital 
accumulation. Associated with each population growth rate n is 
a golden-rule state. The golden-rule consumption per head is 
given by (79) and depends on n, i.e. c* = c (n) . For each n, 
the implied optimal savings rate is easily derived, since 
c = (1 - S) F(k, I). This savings rate is optimal in the sense 
that it maximizes per capita consumption under the given regime 
of population growth. 
Phelps (1966, pp. 179-1 82) went a step further. He addressed 
the policy problem of finding the growth rate n yielding a golden- 
rule state that is socially preferred. This step completely inte- 
grates economic (savings) policy and population policy. Which 
golden-rule state is preferred depends of course on the objectives. 
According to Phelps, society not only wants to consume as much as 
possible, but also wants to grow, i.e. wants to have children. 
Social welfare is, therefore, a function of both the consumption 
per head and the population growth rate. Hence, the function to 
be maximized is u(n,c*). Assuming a constant mortality rate, 
the welfare function may be written in terms of the birth rate b. 
Writing c* = h(b) , the policy problem becomes 
max u[b,h(b) 1 . 
b 
The problem now is to find the optimal combination of fertility 
and consumption in a situation of balanced growth (i.e. when out- 
put, capital, and consumption all grow at the same rate as labor). 
It is a simple but complete demo-economic policy problem. The 
optimality condition is 
E q u a t i o n  ( 8 3 )  s t a t e s  t h a t  f o r  t h e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n  
i n  ( 8 2 )  t o  b e  a t  a  maximum, t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  must  be  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  
m a r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  ( p e r  c a p i t a  b i r t h s ) ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  
g o l d e n - r u l e  consumption p e r  h e a d ,  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  m a r g i n a l  r a t e  
of s u b s t i t u t i o n  between t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  and t h e  g o l d e n - r u l e  con- 
sumption p e r  head.  The b i r t h  r a t e  b* t h a t  y i e l d s  t h e  go lden-  
r u l e  s t a t e  i n  which (82)  i s  maximum i s  t h e  goZden ruZe of p r o -  
c r e a t i o n .  
P h e l p s '  g o l d e n  r u l e  o f  p r o c r e a t i o n  g i v e s  t h e  optimum popu- 
l a t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  u n d e r  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  
i s  c o s t l e s s .  Changing t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  growth r a t e ,  however,  
r e q u i r e s  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  c o u l d  have  been d i r e c t e d  t o  p r o d u c t i v e  
i n v e s t m e n t s .  The p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  income a l l o c a t e d  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  
c o n t r o l  i s  d e n o t e d  by McNicol l  (1975,  p .  671) a s  demographic  
i n v e s t m e n t . *  The f u n c t i o n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
demographic  i n v e s t m e n t  p e r  c a p i t a  a t  t i m e  t ,  j ( t )  s a y ,  and t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  n  is  n  [ j  ( t )  1 . I n  o t h e r  words,  j  ( t )  
d e n o t e s  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  e x p e n d i t u r e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e a c h  a  popu la -  
t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  n .  I f  j ( t )  = 0, n  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  n a t u r a l  r a t e  
o f  p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth .  T o t a l  s a v i n g s  a r e  now d i v i d e d  among i n -  
ves tment  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  and demographic i n v e s t m e n t .  The 
b a s i c  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n  ( 5 9 )  i s  t h e n  
I n  t h e  s i m p l e  c a s e ,  j ( t )  is a  c o n s t a n t  f r a c t i o n  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  
income, i . e .  j ( t )  = g F ( k , l ) ;  hence  t h e  demographic  r e s p o n s e  
f u n c t i o n  i s  n [ F  ( k , l )  ] and p e r  c a p i t a  consumption i s  
To f i n d  t h e  s t e a d y - s t a t e  o r  e q u i l i b r i u m  l e v e l  o f  demographic  
i n v e s t m e n t  w e  r e c a l l  P h e l p s '  g o l d e n  r u l e  o f  p r o c r e a t i o n .  The 
p o p u l a t i o n  g rowth  r a t e  o r  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  t h a t  maximizes  t h e  s o c i a l  
w e l f a r e  d e r i v e d  from b o t h  p e r  c a p i t a  consumption and g rowth  r a t e  
i s  such  t h a t  
6c* 
= h '  ( b * )  = - u  /u b c '  
* M c N i c o l l ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  demographic  i n v e s t m e n t  d i f f e r s  from 
t h a t  o f  Sauvy (1976,  p .  6 4 ) ,  who c o n s i d e r s  it t o  b e  t h a t  p a r t  
of t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t  r e q u i r e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  
o r  t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o .  The l a t t e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  i d e n t i c a l  
t o  c a p i t a l  widen ing .  
The demographic investment associated with a birth rate b* is 
j*. Hence 
"* hS[b(j*)] =-ub/uc , 6b= 
and 
The optimal demographic investment is such that the loss in 
utility from reducing the population by one unit is exactly equal 
to the utility derived from the higher per capita consumption. 
Therefore, at the optimum, a given increment of investment has 
the same impact whether allocated to production (and consumption) 
or to population control. 
Another approach to finding the optimum level of demographic 
investment has been taken by Sato and Davis (1971, p. 890). The 
authors assume that population grows endogenously but can be in- 
fluenced by direct policy intervention. The demographic response 
function is therefore n[f(k,l),g], where g is the fraction of per 
capita income allocated to population control. This is an exten- 
sion of the problem, discussed in the previous section, of deter- 
mining an optimum savings rate when population grows endogenously. 
Maximization of per capita consumption (85) yields the "modified" 
golden rule of capital accumulation: 
and 
where 
The introduction of direct population control reduces the 
optimum savings rate even further than before (compare (89) with 
(78)). Population policy should be implemented until the marginal 
impac t  o f  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a v e r a g e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
o f  c a p i t a l  ( o u t p u t - c a p i t a l  r a t i o  l / C ) .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a t  t h e  
optimum, p e r  c a p i t a  income o r  o u t p u t  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t  of  
t h e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o  and t h e  m a r g i n a l  impac t  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  
c o n t r o l  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  Consequen t ly ,  s i n c e  i n  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  
n  = s / C ,  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  growth  r a t e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  must be  
S i n c e  s / C  i s  H a r r o d ' s  w a r r a n t e d  r a t e  of  g rowth ,  t h e  q u a n t i t y  
- s ( 6 n / 6 g )  may b e  c a l l e d  t h e  m o d i f i e d  w a r r a n t e d  r a t e  o f  growth 
f o r  endogenous p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  and d i r e c t  p o l i c y  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  
The p o p u l a t i o n  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e  o r  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  c o n s i d e r e d  
by P h e l p s  i s  t h e  growth r a t e  ( o r  b i r t h  r a t e  i f  m o r t a l i t y  i s  
c o n s t a n t ) .  Other  a u t h o r s  have  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  
optimum s i z e  o r  d e n s i t y  of t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  For  example ,  Dasgupta  
(1969)  t r e a t s  t h e  problem f i r s t  f o r m u l a t e d  by W i c k s e l l ;  namely, 
what  s i z e  ( d e n s i t y )  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  under  g i v e n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i s  
t h e  most  advan tageous?  Pos ing  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  optimum p o p u l a t i o n  
s i z e  i m p l i e s  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  a  z e r o  growth r a t e  i s  b e s t ,  s i n c e  
o n l y  i f  n  = 0 c a n  a n  optimum p o p u l a t i o n  be  m a i n t a i n e d  ( o t h e r  con- 
d i t i o n s  b e i n g  e q u a l ) .  The c o n c e p t  o f  optimum s i z e  i s  more s u i t -  
a b l e  f o r  " c l a s s i c a l "  economic reg imes  i n  which t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  
f i n i t e  r e s o u r c e s  o r  o f  some f i x e d  p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  l a n d  
e v e n t u a l l y  l e a d s  t o  d i m i n i s h i n g  r e t u r n s .  The c o n c e p t  o f  optimum 
growth  r a t e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  f i t s  t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  r eg ime ,  
w i t h  no r e s o u r c e  c o n s t r a i n t s  b u t  w i t h  c o n s t a n t  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  f a c t o r s . *  
P o l i c y  O b j e c t i v e s  
What i s  t h e  optimum p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  o r  t h e  optimum growth 
r a t e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ?  According t o  P h e l p s ,  a n  optimum growth  
r a t e  i s  one t h a t  maximizes ( 8 2 ) .  I n  t h e  demo-economic p o l i c y  
l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e  u s u a l l y  i n v o l v e s  a  measure  o f  
p e r  c a p i t a  consumption.  Two t y p e s  o f  w e l f a r e  i n d i c e s  a r e  used 
f r e q u e n t l y :  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  a s  a  d i r e c t  f u n c t i o n  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  
u t i l i t y ;  and s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  as a  we igh ted  f u n c t i o n  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  
u t i l i t y ,  t h e  w e i g h t  b e i n g  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e .  W e  c o n s i d e r  b o t h  
i n d i c e s  i n  a  s t a t i c  and a  dynamic framework. 
W e l f a r e  i s  u s u a l l y  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  consumption.  The 
t o t a l  consumption s t r e a m  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  e q u a l  t o  
t h e  t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  F [K ( t )  , L  ( t )  1 l e s s  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  I ( t )  = 
d K ( t ) / d t .  Both t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  and t h e  t o t a l  u t i l i t y  c r i t e r i a  
may b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  a  s t a t i c  and a  dynamic framework. 
*These d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  c l a s s i c a l  and n e o c l a s s i c a l  economic r e g i m e s  
f o l l o w  A r t h u r  and McNicoll  (1977,  p .  1 1 4 ) .  
I n  s t a t i c  a n a l y s e s ,  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  w e l f a r e  c r i t e r i o n  i s  
s imply  
The optimum p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  is  o b t a i n e d  when p e r  c a p i t a  consump- 
t i o n  i s  a t  a  maximum, i . e .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  optimum p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  i s  reached  when t h e  con- 
t r i b u t i o n  t o  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  m a r g i n a l  p e r s o n  is  e q u a l  t o  h i s  
consumption (which i s  t h e  a v e r a g e  consumpt ion) .  
The t o t a l - u t i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  supposes  t h a t  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  
is  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a v e r a g e  i n d i v i d u a l  u t i l i t y  weigh ted  by p o p u l a t i o n  
s i z e .  The u s e  of such  a n  approach  h a s  been s t r o n g l y  endorsed  by 
Meade ( 1 9 5 5 ) .  Meade performed a  s t a t i c  a n a l y s i s .  The o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n  U ( C )  i s  s imply  t h e  p r o d u c t  u ( c )  x L, where L  d e n o t e s  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e .  T h i s  i s  known a s  t h e  Bentham c r i t e r i o n  
(McNicol l ,  1975, p.  6 6 6 ) . *  The optimum p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  i s  g i v e n  
by t h e  c o n d i t i o n  
where 6c/6L i s  g i v e n  by ( 9 2 ) .  Hence o p t i m a l i t y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  
which means t h a t  t h e  u t i l i t y  of a  m a r g i n a l  i n d i v i d u a l  e n t e r i n g  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  (and consuming a t  t h e  a v e r a g e  l e v e l )  must e q u a l  
*According t o  Meade (1955,  p .  8 8 ) ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  consumption 
l e v e l  C o  a t  which l i f e  i s  j u s t  e n j o y a b l e ,  i . e .  U ( C O )  = 0 .  The 
q u a n t i t y  Co i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  w e l f a r e  s u b s i s t e n c e  l e v e l .  
t h e  d i s u t i l i t y  h e  c a u s e s  t o  t h e  o t h e r  members o f  t h e  popu la -  
t i o n .  
I n  dynamic a n a l y s e s ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  f rom consumption a t  d i f -  
f e r e n t  t i m e  p e r i o d s  must  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h e  f o r -  
m u l a t i o n  o f  a  measure  o f  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e .  I f  p d e n o t e s  t h e  t i m e  
p r e f e r e n c e  o r  t h e  r a t e  o f  d i s c o u n t ,  t h e n  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  u t i l i t y  
c r i t e r i o n  i s  
where  
c ( t )  i s  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  consumption a t  t i m e  t ,  i . e .  
c ( t )  = [ l  - s ( t ) l  F ( k , l ) ,  
u ( . )  i s  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  and 
T  i s  t h e  p l a n n i n g  h o r i z o n .  
The t o t a l  u t i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  i s  
where  L ( t )  i s  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  t i m e  t .  
Both o f  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  used  i n  dynamic p o l i c y  
mode l s .  Dasgupta  (1969 ,  p.  297) compares  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i c i e s  
by a s s e s s i n g  t h e i r  impac t  on t o t a l  w e l f a r e  ( 9 6 ) .  He a r g u e s  t h a t  
i t  i s  a  b e t t e r  measure  t o  compare t h e  u l t i m a t e  v a l u e  o f  h a v i n g  
one  more p e r s o n  i n  t h e  wor ld  w i t h  t h e  u l t i m a t e  v a l u e  o f  p r e s e n t  
p e o p l e  hav ing  a  b i t  more t o  consume. Both p o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  and 
u t i l i t y  f rom p e r  c a p i t a  consumpt ion  e n t e r  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  
d i r e c t l y .  S a t o  and Dav i s  (1971)  compare t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  i m p l i c a -  
t i o n s  o f  b o t h  w e l f a r e  i n d i c e s  on t h e  optimum p o l i c y ,  u n d e r  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  grows endogenous ly ,  i . e .  t h a t  t h e  
economic dynamics  a r e  t h o s e  g i v e n  by ( 6 5 )  . Maximiza t ion  o f  ( 9 5 )  
s u b j e c t  t o  ( 6 5 )  y i e l d s  a n  optimum s t e a d y - s t a t e  s a v i n g s  r a t e  e q u a l  
t o  
The optimum p e r  c a p i t a  consumpt ion  i s  of  c o u r s e  c *  = F ( k * ,  1  ) - k*n 
Note t h a t  f o r  p = 0 ,  ( 9 7 )  r e d u c e s  t o  t h e  m o d i f i e d  g o l d e n  r u l e  o f  
c a p i t a l  a c c u m u l a t i o n  (81)  . 
Maximizat ion o f  ( 9 6 )  s u b j e c t  t o  ( 6 5 ) ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
y i e l d s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s .  The s t e a d y  s t a t e  i s  g i v e n  by 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  
U 
- n '  = ( P  - "' [ p  - F ( k * , l ) ( l  - k * n g ) ]  , 
u 1  F '  ( k * ,  1 )  
where u  i s  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  Note t h a t  when p o p u l a t i o n  
grows exogenous ly ,  n '  = 0 and ( 9 8 )  r e d u c e s  t o  
i . e . ,  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  o f  c a p i t a l  must be  e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t e  
of d i s c o u n t  o r  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e . *  The s t e a d y - s t a t e  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  
r a t i o  i s  de te rmined  e n t i r e l y  by t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e .  The form of 
t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  h a s  no e f f e c t  a t  a l l . * *  But i f  p o p u l a t i o n  
grows endogenous ly ,  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d o e s  p l a y  a  r o l e .  
The c h o i c e  o f  t h e  r a t e  of d i s c o u n t  h a s  been a n  e lement  o f  
d e b a t e  i n  t h e  growth l i t e r a t u r e .  Ramsey (1928)  found d i s c o u n t -  
i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  a t  a  p o s i t i v e  r a t e  " ... a  p r a c t i c e  which i s  e t h i -  
c a l l y  i n d e f e n s i b l e " .  Other  e c o n o m i s t s ,  such  a s  Har rod ,  have 
t a k e n  a  s i m i l a r  s t a n d .  Whether a  p o s i t i v e  r a t e  o f  t i m e  p r e f e r -  
e n c e  i s  u n e t h i c a l  and what t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  s h o u l d  be  a r e  
q u e s t i o n s  beyond t h e  scope  of t h i s  paper .  The f a c t  i s  t h a t  
most e c o n o m i s t s  t o d a y  i n t r o d u c e  some d i s c o u n t i n g  i n  o p t i m a l  
p o l i c y  models .  Some a u t h o r s  i n v e s t i g a t e  and compare t h e  theo-  
r e t i c a l  f e a t u r e s  o f  b o t h  c a s e s  p > 0 and p = 0 ( s e e  e . g .  
Dasgupta ,  1969; S a t o  and Davis ,  1 9 7 1 ) .  
Age Composi t ion and Demo-Economic P o l i c y  
The o p t i m a l  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  o f  demo-economic p o l i c y ,  s t u d i e d  
i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n s ,  a r e  based  on t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  of homo- 
geneous c a p i t a l  and l a b o r .  The v a l i d i t y  of t h e  o p t i m a l  p o l i c i e s  
depends  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h i s  u n d e r l y i n g  a s s u m p t i o n .  
* T h i s  i s  t h e  Ramsey r u l e .  The r a t e  of t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e  a l s o  
may b e  w r i t t e n  a s  
w i t h  p ( t )  = e-Ptu '  [ c  ( t )  1 ; i . e . ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e  i s  
t h e  r a t e  o f  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y .  
**The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  o f  c e n t r a l  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  
t h e  optimum t r a j e c t o r y  t o  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
R e c e n t l y ,  some e f f o r t  h a s  been d e v o t e d  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
more d i s a g g r e g a t e d  p o l i c y  models ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a g e - s p e c i f i c  
models .  The f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  based  on work c a r r i e d  o u t  
by Samuelson and A r t h u r  and McNicol l .  
Samuelson c o n s i d e r s  o n l y  two a g e  g r o u p s .  * The young a g e  
g r o u p  c o n s i s t s  of  t h e  working p o p u l a t i o n ,  w h i l e  t h e  o l d  a g e  g r o u p  
c o n t a i n s  o n l y  r e t i r e d  p e o p l e .  I n  t h i s  s i m p l e  model,  t h e  working 
p o p u l a t i o n  s u p p o r t s  t h e  r e t i r e d  p o p u l a t i o n  t h r o u g h  "consumption" 
l o a n s .  Repayment c a n  b e  e x p e c t e d  when t h i s  working p o p u l a t i o n  
retires.  T h e r e f o r e ,  e a c h  g e n e r a t i o n  i s  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  f o l l o w -  
i n g  g e n e r a t i o n .  The s u p p o r t  o r  consumption t r a n s f e r s  r e c e i v e d  
by t h e  r e t i r e d  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  i f  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
young p o p u l a t i o n  expands ,  which i s  t h e  c a s e  i f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
g rowth  r a t e  rises. I n  Samuelson ' s  two-age model w i t h  i n t e r -  
g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
g rowth  r a t e ,  t h e  b e t t e r .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  t h e  
optimum d e f i n e d  i n  S o l o w ' s  n e o c l a s s i c a l  model and i t s  e x t e n s i o n s  
(see f o r  example e q u a t i o n  (80)  ) . 
A c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  Solow model i n  (59)  w i t h  t h e  Samuelson 
model o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  y i e l d s  an i n t e r m e d i a t e  r e s u l t .  
R e c a l l  e q u a t i o n  ( 7 2 ) .  There  t o t a l  o u t p u t  i s  e q u a l  t o  consump- 
t i o n  and i n v e s t m e n t  ( s a v i n g s )  : 
Consumption a t  t i m e  t i s  t h e  sum o f  t h e  consumption o f  t h e  young 
and t h e  o l d  p o p u l a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  m o r t a l i t y ,  and f o r  
t i m e  i n t e r v a l s  e q u a l  t o  a g e  i n t e r v a l s ,  t h e  number o f  o l d  p e o p l e  
a t  t i m e  t i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  number o f  young p e o p l e  a t  t i m e  t - 1 .  
1 L e t  Lt-, d e n o t e  t h e  young p o p u l a t i o n  a t  t i m e  t - 1 ,  and ct and c 2  t 
t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  consumption of  t h e  young and o l d  p o p u l a t i o n s  r e s p e c -  
t i v e l y ;  t h e n  (99)  becomes 
D i v i d i n g  by Lt y i e l d s  
* A t  t h e  m i c r o - l e v e l ,  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a g i n g  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  
t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a n  e x p l i c i t  l i f e  c y c l e  ( e - g .  c h i l d h o o d ,  
work, c h i l d b e a r i n g ,  r e t i r e m e n t ) .  
where n  i s  t h e  growth r a t e  of l a b o r .  I n  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e ,  c a p i t a l  
and l a b o r  grow a t  t h e  same r a t e ;  hence 
Compare (101)  w i t h  ( 7 6 ) .  Note t h a t  e a c h  combina t ion  o f  n ,  
c 1  and c 2  d e f i n e s  a  g o l d e n  s t a t e .  Each g o l d e n  s t a t e  i s  c h a r a c -  
t e r i z e d  by a  c o n s t a n t  c a p i t a l - l a b o r  r a t i o .  
Fo l lowing  P h e l p s ,  Samuelson a s k s  which g o l d e n  s t a t e  y i e l d s  
maximum u t i l i t y  from consumption.  The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  must  o f  
c o u r s e  r e f l e c t  l i f e t i m e  consumption,  i . e .  u  = u  [ c l  , c21  . There  
i s  a  u n i q u e  r e l a t i o n  between c 1  and c 2 ,  g i v e n  by (101)  : 
The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  
and maximiza t ion  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  k ,  c 1  and c 2  y i e l d s  t h e  f o l l o w -  
i n g  o p t i m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s :  
C o n d i t i o n  (104)  i s  P h e l p s '  g o l d e n  r u l e  o f  c a p i t a l  accumula- 
t i o n .  E q u a t i o n  (105)  s t a t e s  t h a t  f o r  u t i l i t y  t o  be  a  maximum, 
t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  of  consumption must b e  t h e  same 
f o r  a l l  a g e s .  T h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  t h e  b ioZog icaZ  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
r e l a t i o n  of  Samuelson. The two c o n d i t i o n s  t o g e t h e r  c o n s t i t u t e  
t h e  g o l d e n  r u l e .  
There  i s  a  g o l d e n - r u l e  s t a t e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  e v e r y  p o p u l a t i o n  
growth r a t e  n.  One may, t h e r e f o r e ,  be  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s e l e c t i n g  a  
r a t e  n  t h a t  i s  s o c i a l l y  d e s i r a b l e .  T h i s  problem h a s  been a d d r e s s e d  
by P h e l p s  and h a s  l e d  him t o  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  g o l d e n  r u l e  
of p r o c r e a t i o n .  P h e l p s  i n c l u d e d  b o t h  p e r  c a p i t a  consumption and 
the population growth rate in the welfare function. Samuelson 
(1975, p. 534), however, kept to the function (103). Maximiza- 
tion of (103) with respect to n yields: 
and 
The growth rate n** that maximizes lifetime welfare is 
denoted by Samuelson as the goldenest golden-rule state. More- 
over, at a growth rate n**, private lifetime savings will be 
just sufficient to support the goldenest golden-rule state. 
Since k and cL are themselves functions of n in (1 04) and (1 05), 
(106) is an implicit function of n**. To find the true maximum, 
second-order conditions must be supplemented. Note that rapid 
or slow growth no longer is "better", but that the value of n** 
is determined by the utility function and the production function. 
(Compare this result with Phelps' golden rule of procreation.) 
Arthur and McNicoll (1 978) have generalized the two-age 
life cycle model to one with a continuous-age llfe cycle. This 
generalization allows for an inclusion of child-dependency costs. 
The intergenerational transfer is not only from working popula- 
tion to old, but also from working population to children. 
Therefore, the net intergenerational transfer effect of growth 
is no longer necessarily positive; hence the inclusion of trans- 
fers to younger people therefore tends to result in lower optimal 
growth. 
The authors consider continuous intervals for both time and 
age. Equation (99) becomes 
The population is assumed to be stable, i.e. with constant age- 
specific rates of fertility and mortality, constant age distri- 
bution, and growing at a constant rate n (see example, Keyfitz, 
1968; Rogers ,  1 9 7 5 ) .  At s t a b i l i t y ,  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  a t  e x a c t  a g e  
x  a t  t i m e  t i s  
where 
l ( 0 , t )  i s  t h e  number o f  b i r t h s  a t  t i m e  t ,  
p ( x )  i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u r v i v a l  from b i r t h  t o  a g e  x .  
L e t  c ( x , t )  d e n o t e  a g e - s p e c i f i c  p e r  c a p i t a  consumption a t  
t i m e  t. E q u a t i o n  (107)  may be  e x p r e s s e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
where o is t h e  l a s t  a g e  g roup .  
D i v i d i n g  by t h e  amount o f  l a b o r  Lt ,  where 
and X ( x )  is  t h e  a g e - s p e c i f i c  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e ,  w e  
have t h a t  
where c ( t )  is  t h e  a v e r a g e  consumption p e r  w o r k e r  a t  t i m e  t ,  i . e . ,  
0 
' i t )  = ju e-nxp ( x )  A ( x ) d r  
0  
I n  s t e a d y  s t a t e ,  c a p i t a l  and l a b o r  grow a t  t h e  same r a t e  n ,  and 
c ( x , t )  = c ( x ) ;  hence* 
Each c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  5 and n  d e f i n e s  a  g o l d e n  s t a t e .  Note t h a t  
(112)  i s  t h e  f a m i l i a r  Solow c o n d i t i o n ,  s F ( k , l )  = nk ( s e e  a l s o  
A r t h u r  and McNicol l ,  1977, p. 1 1 6 ) .  
Which g o l d e n  s t a t e  y i e l d s  a  maximum l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y  from 
consumpt ion?  I f  u [ c ( x ) ]  is  t h e  u t i l i t y  from consumption a t  a g e  
x ,  t h e n  a  baby j u s t  b o r n  h a s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  p ( x )  o f  e n j o y i n g  t h i s  
consumpt ion .  Maximizat ion o f  
s u b j e c t  t o  (111)  y i e l d s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o p t i m a l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
a l l  x :  
G U  [ c *  ( x )  I = Gu [ c *  ( x )  I ; 
S c  ( x )  (114)  6c  ( 0 )  
i . e . ,  t h e  d i s c o u n t e d  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  o f  consumption must  b e  t h e  
same f o r  a l l  a g e s .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  f o r  t h e  l i f e t i m e  w e l f a r e  t o  
b e  a  maximum, t h e  d i s u t i l i t y  o f  t h e r e  b e i n g  one  u n i t  o f  consump- 
t i o n  less a t  a g e  0 ( l o a n )  must b e  o f f s e t  by t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  
consumpt ion  o f  t h i s  u n i t  a t  age  x ,  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  i n t e r e s t  
( r e p a y m e n t ) .  T h i s  r e l a t i o n  i s  t h e  " b i o l o g i c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e "  
c o n d i t i o n ,  s i m i l a r  t o  ( 1  0 5 ) .  
As i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  two a g e s ,  we s e a r c h  now f o r  t h e  g rowth  
r a t e  n  t h a t  y i e l d s  t h e  most g o l d e n  g o l d e n - r u l e  s t a t e .  Maximizing 
(1  1 3 )  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  n  g i v e s  
*Equa t ion  (112)  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  e q u a t i o n  ( 8 )  o f  A r t h u r  and 
McNicol l  (1977,  p .  1 1 6 ) .  Whereas t h e  o r i g i n a l  a r t i c l e  used  
t h e  a v e r a g e  consumption p e r  p e r s o n ,  we u s e  t h e  a v e r a g e  consump- 
t i o n  p e r  worker .  T h i s  s i m p l i f i e s  t h e  r e s u l t .  
Transforming this expression gives 
here c* is the optimal average consumption per worker, 1 is the 
average labor force participation rate, and Ac and AL are, re- 
spectively, the mean age of consuming and of the labor force. 
Therefore, the lifetime welfare effect of changing the population 
growth rate is equal to an intergenerational transfer effect (the 
difference in Ac and AL)* and a capital widening effect. The 
latter effect is always negative, while the intergenerational 
transfer effect can be either positive or negative. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to review the existing links 
between formal representations of population policies and eco- 
nomic policies. This bringing together of the work of demogra- 
phers and economists aims to contribute to better policy-making. 
The common feature of the models reviewed is the underlying 
mathematical paradigm. Any dynamic policy problem may formally 
be stated as an optimal control problem, and the theory of opti- 
mal control provides the apparatus necessary to solve for the 
optimal values of the policy variables. 
Two groups of demo-economic policy models have been examined, 
each in increasing order of complexity: planning-oriented models 
and theoretically-oriented models. Planning-oriented models may 
be viewed as logical extensions of mathematical demographic growth 
models to the policy domain. The demographic growth model itself 
is imbedded in the policy models as the homogeneous part of the 
state equation. The discussion focused on two major issues in 
dynamic policy modeling: existence and design. Systems theory 
provides the necessary mathematical tools. 
Theoretically-oriented models originated in the theory of 
economic growth and have a much higher level of abstraction than 
planning-oriented models. Studies of their underlying theoreti- 
cal concepts, of the structure of their policy problem, and of 
*The average age of consuming is usually three to four years 
below the average working age (Arthur and McNicoll, 1978). 
the existence and stability of their optimal policies have re- 
ceived much attention. 
This paper presents some approaches to linking demo-economic 
growth and policy in formal models. Fundamental differences in 
the two approaches do not permit a complete synthesis at this 
time. Synthesis may not even be desirable since the two ap- 
proaches serve a different purpose. 
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